COURT
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA
Kearney(1), Rice(2) and Martin(3) JJ.

CWDS
  Costs - Court fees and costs - Filing fees and transcript costs - Power of
Magistrate to waive payment by litigant
  Courts and Judges - Disqualification for bias - Ascertainment of facts upon
which to base application - Whether litigant may question Judge in order to
ascertain facts
  Courts and Judges - Court proceedings - Video and audio recording -
Application to record by litigant - Refusal of application - Nature of Court's
decision
  Criminal Law - Legal resources and representation - Minimum guarantees for
persons charged - Article 14(3) International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights - Power to enforce in Australia guarantees in Declaration
  International Law - "Nuremburg Principles" - "War Crimes", "Crimes Against
Humanity" or "Crimes Against Peace" - Whether Principles impose affirmative
duty on individuals to prevent commission of Crimes - Application of
Principles in Australia
  Magistrates - Summons to witness to appear - Apprehension that person
summonsed will not appear - Application for warrant to issue against person
summonsed - Power of magistrate to issue warrant after issue of summons, prior
to appearance date - Justices Act ss 23-25
  Magistrates - Disqualification for bias - Ascertainment of facts upon which
to base application - Whether litigant may question Magistrate in order to
ascertain facts
  Magistrates - Powers - Court fees and costs - Filing fees and transcript
costs - Power of Magistrate to waive payment by litigant
  Practice and Procedure - Court proceedings - Video and audio recording -
Application to record by litigant - Refusal of application - Nature of Court's
decision - Whether appellable
  Cases referred to:
    Polites v The Commonwealth (1945) 70 CLR 60
    Chow Hung Ching v The King (1948) 77 CLR 449
    Bradley v The Commonwealth (1973) 128 CLR 557
    Simsek v MacPhee (1982) 148 CLR 636
    Jago v Judges of The District Court (1988) 12
    NSWLR 558
    R v Loughnan (1981) VR 443
  Cases followed:
    S and M Motor Repairs Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil
    (Australia) Pty Ltd (1988) 12 NSWLR 358

HRNG
DARWIN
#DATE 27:11:1989
  The appellant, L Limbo, appeared in person
  Counsel for the Respondent   :  T J Riley QC
                                  and C R Clift
  Solicitor for the Respondent :  Australian
                                  Government Solicitor

ORDER

JUDGE1
  I have had the benefit of reading the opinion of Martin J.  I respectfully
concur in his Honour's conclusions and the orders he proposes, for the reasons
he has stated, and have nothing to add.

ORDER
  Appeals dismissed.
  Applications refused.

JUDGE2
  The question posed for consideration on a reference to the Full Court by
Nader J. in its amended form is:-
    "Whether a judge or magistrate has an
    obligation to answer questions of a litigant
    concerning matters which may disqualify him if the
    litigant knew about them, for example military,
    defence or intelligence connections."
2.  In my judgment, the answer is simply, "No". That is not to say, however,
that a judge or magistrate is entitled to sit back where the circumstances
might possibly indicate that a perception of bias is present, and not make
appropriate disclosure in order to remove any suggestion of bias.  It is the
fundamental duty of a judge or magistrate to do so, consistent with the oath
of office which is based on the concept of judicial integrity.  It requires no
reaffirmation since the complete absence of bias is inherent in the judicial
role.  In my opinion, it would be an affront to judicial integrity for a judge
or magistrate to be subjected to any obligation to answer questions of a
litigant. This proposition is so fundamental that no authority is needed to
support it.
3.  A litigant remains protected against any abuse of this principle by the
power of an appellate court to review and remedy the conduct of any judge or
magistrate who might transgress it.
4.  In my opinion it would undermine the administration of justice for a judge
or magistrate to be subject to questioning by a litigant on this or, indeed,
any other topic.
5.  The appellant was given a free rein to ventilate his grievances before the
Full Court and the Court of Appeal.  He was allowed every indulgence to put
his case without the usual stringencies of procedural adherence.  In my view,
it was important that an appellant so imbued with the cause he was championing
so dedicatedly, should be accorded every opportunity of airing his grievances
as he perceived them.  It soon became apparent during the proceedings before
us, however, that the appellant was intent upon using the judicial process as
a means of courting national as well as international publicity in aid of his
fervent belief that global nuclear destruction was close at hand.  His broad
challenge to the impartiality of those whose decisions might be adverse to him
on the ground of their "military, defence or intelligence connections" was, in
my opinion, symptomatic of the fervency of his beliefs.  A zealot, no less
than any other person, is entitled to give vent to the free expression of
opinion without the intervention of bias or prejudice.
6.  Martin J. has dealt extensively with the multifarious matters which have
made their way to the Full Court, and the Court of Appeal.  I am in agreement
with everything he has said, including the orders he proposes.

JUDGE3
Background
  There are before the Full Court and the Court of Appeal, constituted by the
same bench, a large number of issues.  They were either referred to the Full
Court under s. 21 of the Supreme Court Act, or are the subject of applications
for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.  It was agreed by both parties
that all issues would be dealt with at the one hearing, which lasted 5 days.
All of the matters for consideration arose at the instance of the appellant,
who calls himself by the name given in these proceedings.  For some other
purposes he is known as Leonard John Lindon. He is a qualified legal
practitioner, admitted to practise in that name in South Australia, and is
upon the roll of practitioners of the High Court of Australia.  He appeared
unrepresented.
2.  On 19 October 1987 he was charged under s. 89(1) of the Crimes Act
(Commonwealth) for that on that day he did without lawful excuse trespass upon
prohibited Commonwealth land, namely the Joint Defence Space Research
Facility, an establishment near Alice Springs, commonly known as "Pine Gap".
3.  On 14 April 1988, he was convicted of that offence by the Court of Summary
Jurisdiction sitting at Alice Springs and fined $250.  From that conviction he
appealed to the Supreme Court, which allowed the appeal in March 1989 and
remitted the matter to the former Court for re-hearing. The appeal was allowed
upon the ground that the appellant had not had a fair hearing. The appellant
then set about securing the attendance of witnesses before that Court upon the
re-hearing, which was set down for 2-4 August 1989.  It is largely the
decisions made in the course of that exercise that gave rise to these
proceedings.  During the course of various preliminary applications other
questions arose and they also found their way to the Full Court and the Court
of Appeal.  In the Full Court the appellant raised a number of preliminary
matters.
4.  Because of the number of issues, the manner in which they arose and the
considerations applying to them, it is difficult to prepare these reasons in
an orderly fashion. The best approach is to proceed in chronological order.
The Kerr Warrant
5.  On 28 March 1989 the appellant arranged to have issued summonses to appear
at the August re-hearing, directed to the Prime Minister, Peter Woodruff, (who
it is alleged is the "Australian Deputy-Head of Pine Gap") and Glen Kerr
("U.S. boss of Pine Gap").  I do not decide the question, which is not before
the Full Court, as to whether service of those summonses was effective.  In
any event, on 30 March 1989, the appellant applied to Mr Hook, Stipendiary
Magistrate, for the issue of a warrant for the arrest of Mr Kerr upon the
ground that it was probable that Mr Kerr would not attend to give evidence on
the date specified in the summons.  The appellant gave evidence upon oath as
to the service of the summons and as to his belief that Mr Kerr was about to
leave Australia, and his grounds for so believing. The application was refused
by the learned Magistrate upon the ground that he had no power to order that a
warrant for arrest issue in those circumstances. He so found by reference to
the relevant provision of the Justices Act. The following day that application
was renewed, the appellant indicating that he had further evidence going to Mr
Kerr's intended departure.  I note in passing that His Worship had already
held that he had no jurisdiction to issue such a warrant, and, if he was
right, then it would not matter what further evidence might be available on
that point.
6.  It was on this occasion that the appellant sought to address the
Magistrate on "the question of the Nuremberg Principles".  His Worship
declined to hear him on that, or to entertain his application unless it was
brought by the "proper procedure", referring to the Justices Act and
Regulations in a general way.  There is no prescribed form for an application
such as the appellant sought to make. Later on that day he did, however, file
an application in writing which sought orders that a warrant be issued, that
the summons be withdrawn, and that Mr Kerr be brought before the Court for
contempt in permanently leaving the jurisdiction after being served with a
summons, and for costs.  Those applications were also dismissed, as best I can
make out because of the provisions of the Justices Act, and because there was
no evidence, or proposed evidence, that Mr Kerr would not attend on the return
date of the summons even if it were shown that he was about to leave
Australia.
7.  The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal against those decisions.  It is
doubtful that an appeal lies from such a decision of a Justice.  The right of
appeal (see s. 163) is given only from a conviction, order or adjudication of
the Court, which by definition (s. 4) means "Justices forming the Court for
the purposes of hearing and adjudicating upon any case or matter which they
have power to determine in a summary way .....". The distinction is between
the Court so comprised and performing that duty, and a single Justice
exercising ministerial functions.  That issue was not argued before this Court
and I should say no more about it.
8.  The "appeals" came before Justice Nader on 12 April 1989 and he ordered
that they be referred to the Full Court, "sitting at Darwin".
9.  The first substantive issue is whether in the circumstances the learned
Magistrate wrongfully declined to issue the warrant.
10.  Sections 23-25 of the Justices Act provide as follows:
    "23. SUMMONS TO WITNESS
    If a Justice or the clerk is satisfied that any
    person is likely to give material evidence or to
    have in his possession or power any article (which
    term includes any document, writing, or thing)
    required for the purposes of evidence upon behalf
    of either party to any information or complaint,
    the Justice or clerk may issue a summons to the
    person requiring him to appear, at a time and
    place mentioned in the summons, before such
    Justices as shall then be there, to testify what
    he knows concerning the matter of the information
    or complaint, or to produce the article, or to
    testify and produce as aforesaid (as the case may
    be).
    24. ON REFUSAL WARRANT TO ISSUE
    If any person summoned neglects or refuses to
    appear, and no just excuse is offered for such
    neglect or refusal, then any Justice before whom
    the person should have appeared may issue a
    warrant to bring and have such person, at a time
    and place therein mentioned, before such Justices
    as shall then be there, provided that it is proved
    to the satisfaction of the Justice -
    (a) that the summons was duly served; and
    (b) (if the summons relates to a complaint)
    that a reasonable sum was paid or tendered for the
    costs and expenses of attendance.
        25. WARRANT IN FIRST INSTANCE
    If a Justice is satisfied, by evidence upon oath,
    that it is probable that any person will not
    attend to give evidence or to produce any article
    without being compelled to do so, then, instead of
    issuing a summons as provided by section 23, he
    may issue his warrant in the first instance."
11.  In this case the appellant had secured the issue of a summons directed to
Mr Kerr requiring him to appear on the date fixed for the commencement of the
re-hearing of the charge, at the Court House at Alice Springs.  It had
apparently been properly served by the indirect means provided for in s.
27(b).  Information then came to the notice of the appellant that Mr Kerr was
about to leave Australia and he sought a warrant for his arrest. Looking at s.
24 there was no evidence or proposed evidence to the effect that he would
neglect or refuse to attend as required by the summons.  In any event the day
for his appearance had not arrived and it is only if the person summonsed
"neglects or refuses to appear" at that time that a warrant may be issued, and
then only by the Justice "before whom (he) should have appeared."
12.  Section 25 does not apply.  It provides for the alternative to the issue
of a summons, that is, the issue of a warrant in the first instance, if the
Justice is satisfied by evidence on oath that it is probable that a person
will not attend if a summons is issued.  The warrant (Form 6 to the
Regulations) provides for the person to be brought before the Justice and to
be bound over to appear on the date of the hearing.  There is no express
provision authorising the issue of a warrant after a summons has been issued,
or to "withdraw" a summons whether served or not, even if it were shown -
which was not the case here - that it was probable that the person summonsed
would not attend in obedience to the summons.  Assuming that an appeal is
available, it has not been shown that the learned magistrate erred in
declining to issue a warrant for Mr Kerr's arrest, and the appeal should
accordingly be dismissed.
13.  The statutory provisions may be inadequate, but they are binding on the
Justice or clerk.
14.  On 3 April 1989 the appellant went before Nader J. upon an oral
application, seeking an injunction to restrain Mr Kerr from leaving the
country or for an order in the nature of mandamus directing the magistrate to
issue a warrant for his arrest.  Those applications were refused and nothing
further arises from those decisions of His Honour.
May a litigant question a Magistrate or Judge as to his background?
15.  On 5 April 1989, the appellant again went before Mr Hook S.M.  He said
that his application concerned a question of disqualification for bias and he
asked His Worship to declare that he "had no military, defence or intelligence
connections". His Worship responded by informing the appellant that if there
were grounds for claiming that he may be biased then the appropriate course
was to wait till the hearing to make an application.  It was not clear at that
stage that His Worship would be hearing the case in August, but the appellant
persevered in seeking the disclosure upon the basis that it would be better to
have that issue disposed of before the date fixed for the hearing; if His
Worship did disclose any such connection, then the application for
disqualification should be dealt with earlier, so that first of all, if His
Worship declined to disqualify himself the decision could be reviewed in the
Supreme Court, and secondly, so that the hearing should not be delayed whilst
the issue was resolved.
16.  His Worship declined the invitation to disclose any such connections.  In
effect, he told the appellant that it was up to him to make out his grounds
for an application for disqualification.  In his successive appearances before
another Magistrate, Justice Nader, the Chief Justice, the Full Court and the
Court of Appeal, the appellant has sought to have each judicial officer
disclose whether he had any military, defence or intelligence connections.
Some have chosen to make a disclosure along those lines as part of discussion,
others have posed hypothetical situations, none has acceded to a request that
he disqualify himself on that basis. Some have specifically refused to answer
the question.
17.  When certain so-called appeals were before Nader J., and the question put
to him, His Honour referred the matter to the Full Court.  The question as
amended in the Full Court, by consent, is in the following terms:
    "Whether a Judge or Magistrate has an
    obligation to answer questions of a litigant
    concerning matters which may disqualify him if the
    litigant knew about them, for example military,
    defence or intelligence connections."
18.  I consider it can be reformulated in more general, and perhaps in more
accurate terms, as follows:
    "Whether a litigant may seek to
    ascertain by direct questioning of a Magistrate or
    Judge any facts concerning him or her which, if so
    disclosed, might lead to an application that he or
    she disqualify himself or herself upon the grounds
    of reasonable apprehension of bias based upon the
    facts sought to be disclosed".
19.  I have already mentioned that the appellant raised this issue in a more
direct way by requesting the specific disclosure by each member of the Full
Court.  After consideration the Court unanimously held that no such request
ought to be made and said it would give reasons later.
20.  I do not understand the applicant to be suggesting that a disclosure
pursuant to such a question would necessarily lead to an inference of actual
bias, but rather that such a disclosure may give rise to a reasonable
apprehension that fair minded persons, taking into account all the
circumstances, could consider that the judge might not resolve the question
before him with a fair and unprejudiced mind.
21.  Usually, the facts upon which it might be thought a reasonable
apprehension of bias could arise, are known to the litigants or at least one
of them.  Sometimes the Judge, as a matter of judicial integrity, makes facts
known to the parties which he considers ought to be disclosed, so that the
parties or either of them can consider whether a reasonable apprehension of
bias could arise.  Even in such a case it is necessary that an application be
made that the Judge disqualify himself, and it is a matter for the exercise of
the Judge's discretion as to whether he should accede to the application.  The
facts which a Judge might disclose are generally facts which are known to some
members of the public, not necessarily to the parties or their advisers, but
it is for the Judge to decide for himself whether a disclosure should be made,
not for a litigant to venture upon a "fishing expedition" with a view to
ascertaining whether there is something personal to the Judge, and not known
to him, which could found an application that the Judge disqualify himself.
Judges are capable of putting aside personal predilections arising from life's
experiences.  We all, I suspect, have views, opinions and attitudes moulded by
a variety of factors.  Rigorous training in the discipline of the law and in
particular the requirement of objectivity, together with the public insistence
upon judicial integrity, mean that unless some material matter is raised by a
litigant, or voluntarily disclosed by the Judge, it is accepted that there can
be no suggestion of reasonable apprehension of bias.  Edmund Burke spoke of
"The cold neutrality of an impartial Judge".  That is what is expected.  If
impartiality is lacking, or could be fairly thought to be lacking, it may well
become evident sooner or later, but it is not for the litigant to pry into the
Judge's background. It is for the Judge to disclose a fact if it seems to him
that it may be thought to have a bearing upon his neutrality.  An extensive
and, with respect, most useful guide to the principles applicable to judicial
disqualification is to be found in the reasons for decision of Kirby P. in S
and M Motor Repairs Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd (1988) 12 NSWLR
358 at pp 367 to 373.
22.  The answer to the question referred to the Full Court is; "No".
Recording of proceedings by a litigant
23.  Endeavouring to ensure that the case against him would proceed on the
date in August previously fixed and upon his terms, the appellant went before
Ms Thomas, the Chief Stipendiary Magistrate on 6 April 1989, with an
application that she hear the charge commencing on the date fixed.  As to the
dates, he reminded Her Worship that it was important that they be confirmed
since it was the day before "Hiroshima and Nagasaki Day".  He also ensured
that the learned Chief Magistrate was aware that there might be interlocutory
matters to be resolved in the High Court and it was important that that be
done before the date fixed for the commencement of the hearing.  Her Worship
quite sensibly replied that the dates for the re-hearing had been fixed and
there was no need to confirm them.  Quite rightly, she was not then prepared
to indicate whether she or another Magistrate would then constitute the Court.
Her Worship was also asked to make orders pursuant to s. 16 of the Service and
Execution of Process Act, for leave to serve the Ministers for Defence and
Foreign Affairs with summonses to appear.  It is not a matter before the Full
Court, but although Her Worship gave that leave the following day, it may not
have been properly given since the transcript discloses that the summonses had
not then been issued (see s. 16(1) Service and Execution of Process Act).
24.  What became an issue, after Her Worship's decision announced on 7 April,
and referred by Nader J. to the Full Court on a so-called "appeal" to the
Supreme Court, was Her Worship's refusal of an application to allow the
appellant the opportunity to record the proceedings on the re-hearing of the
charge by video and audio equipment.  She gave no reasons.
25.  The appellant sought to preempt the decision, the subject of this
reference, by seeking to be permitted to videotape the proceedings in this
Court.  No ruling was made on that application.  I suspect his thinking was
that if this Court allowed him to record what happened here, then it would be
bound to find that Her Worship was wrong in rejecting his application that he
be allowed to do so in the proceedings listed for rehearing on 2 August.
26.  The Chief Stipendiary Magistrate's decision not to permit the re-hearing
of the charge to be recorded by him was not a judicial decision.  It was a
decision relating to the internal management and control of the Court.  It did
not arise under any statute.  There was no need to give reasons. I would hold
that no appeal lies against Her Worship's decision and, although the question
is now redundant, I am not persuaded that permission to record the proceedings
before this Court on video ought to have been granted.  The feasibility and
desirability of televising court proceedings in general has yet to be
examined; see the discussion in "Counsel", May - June 1989, at pp 5 -17.
Waiving costs of transcripts and Court fees
27.  The proceedings before Her Worship resumed on 7 April.  She announced her
decision regarding service of the summonses directed to the Ministers and her
refusal to permit the appellant to record the proceedings in August.
28.  At that time the appellant raised with the learned Chief Magistrate
matters which he had foreshadowed the previous day.  The first involved
reference to the High Court Rules "about declaring someone a pauper", (see
Part III of Order 16 of those Rules), followed by a request that he be
relieved of the costs involved in obtaining transcript and payment of fees for
filing documents in Court and for the issue of summonses. The High Court Rules
have no application to the Court of Summary Jurisdiction, or this Court.  Her
Worship said she had no power to do what was requested of her.  That matter
was also later referred to the Full Court by Nader J.  There is no express
power in a Magistrate to waive court fees and costs.  So far as I am aware the
only person with power to waive the payment of monies due to the Territory is
the Treasurer, pursuant to s. 73(2)(a) of the Financial Administration and
Audit Act. Fees are prescribed by Regulation 6 of the Justices Regulations for
the filing of certain documents including applications to a Magistrate or
Court, and for the issue of summonses. Regulation 8 exempts members of the
Police Force and public servants, acting as such, from the payment of those
fees.  There are no other exemptions.  There is nothing in the Justices Act or
Regulations expressly requiring that applications be in writing and it thus
appears that if an oral application is made to a Magistrate or the Court, no
fee is payable.  No fee is prescribed for an application made to a Justice or
the Clerk.  I mention these matters only to distinguish between circumstances
where there is no fee prescribed, as opposed to the absence of power in a
Magistrate to waive fees otherwise payable. It seems that transcript is
provided to litigants at a cost, by contract, not regulation.  The practice
has developed in this Court of sometimes ordering that unrepresented litigants
be provided with transcript free of charge.  The power of the Court to so
order may be doubtful, but there the matter rests.
29.  Her Worship was correct.
Miscellaneous applications to the Supreme Court
30.  The appellant then made an undated application in writing to the Supreme
Court in the following terms:
    "IN THE SUPREME COURT
      OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
          No ? of 1989
          Re: LITTLE V LIMBO
       Summary Court, Alice Springs
          APPLICATION TO SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
          For the following orders
      1.    That the appeal against
    "interlocutory" order of Hook S.M. be heard before
    Nader J. leaves Alice Springs next week.
      2.    That the appeal against
    "interlocutory" order of Thomas C.S.M. be heard at
    the same time.
      3.    That the applicant have
    free copies of all transcript since the appeal in
    Little v Limbo and until the end of the August
    trial set for 2nd, 3rd and 4th August 1989.
      4.    That the applicant need
    pay no front-counter fees for lodgement of
    applications, issuing of summons to witness, etc.
      5.    A declaration that the
    applicant is a poor person within s. 26 et seq.
    HIGH COURT RULES.
        This application lodged by Lenin Limbo, 18
    Leichardt Tce, Alice Springs."
31.  These first came before His Honour Justice Nader at Alice Springs on 10
April.  There was general discussion between His Honour and the appellant. The
Notices of Appeal instituting the two appeals referred to in the application
were not then placed before the Court.  However, the appellant opened briefly
on the need for the appeal against one of the decisions of Mr Hook S.M. being
dealt with urgently.  It appears that the learned Magistrate had had a
discussion in Chambers with the appellant and counsel for the respondent a few
days previously, but after he had declined to disqualify himself on the
appellant's application to which reference has been made above. Consequent
upon that discussion His Worship was said to have announced in open Court that
he was disqualifying himself from the re-hearing of the charge in August, but
not from entertaining any interlocutory application.
32.  There are two Magistrates normally sitting in Alice Springs, Mr Barritt
S.M. and Mr Hook S.M.  Mr Barritt had heard the charge against the appellant
which was the subject of the successful appeal in March 1989 and had
apparently disqualified himself from dealing with any matter in relation to
the re-hearing.  Mr Hook apparently felt that although he should not sit on
the re-hearing he need not necessarily disqualify himself from hearing
interlocutory matters.  He adopted a practical approach, no doubt bearing in
mind that there may be no other Magistrate available to entertain any such
application, and reserving to himself the right to decide whether he should
step aside if the nature of any application warranted his doing so.  The
appellant wished that decision to be reviewed on appeal, and quickly. That
issue also made its way into the Full Court.  I do not consider that in all
the circumstances, and on the facts known to us, His Worship was wrong in not
automatically disqualifying himself from hearing interlocutory applications.
Reference was also made to the High Court Rules and the appellant's financial
difficulty.  His Honour suggested he should make another application for
assistance from the Australian Legal Aid Office, the appellant having said
that an application had been refused.  The application was adjourned to 11
April, but time did not permit its being disposed of then and it was further
adjourned to 12 April. On that occasion counsel appeared amicus curiae by
arrangement with the Attorney-General for the Commonwealth. His Honour said
that it would not be possible for him to hear the "appeals" the following week
because of his prior court commitments.  Again, the Notices of Appeal were not
before the Court on 12 April although the appellant told His Honour they had
been filed on the previous Friday (7 April).
33.  During the course of a wide ranging exchange between His Honour and the
appellant, the appellant mentioned the application of the "Nuremberg
Principles" to his defence to the trespass charge, the witnesses he proposed
to call, and the difficulty he perceived in bringing an application for leave
to serve summonses out of the jurisdiction before Mr Hook S.M.  His Honour
took the view that the issues which the appellant said were raised by the
"appeals" should be referred to the Full Court and ordered accordingly.  The
application that the appellant be given copies of transcript free of charge in
the Magistrates Court and the Supreme Court was granted.
34.  On the face of it, the Notice of Appeal against the decisions of Mr Hook
S.M., had not been filed when the application was first made to His Honour on
10 April.  The copy made available to this Court is dated 15 April.  The
Notice of Appeal against the decision of Ms Thomas C.S.M. is dated 7 April.
35.  On 17 April the appellant was back before Nader J. again, upon
applications as follows:
        "IN THE SUPREME COURT
      OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
      ALICE SPRINGS REGISTRY
      No ? of 1989
          RE: LITTLE v LIMBO (Alice Springs Court of
       Summary Jurisdiction) and the Nurenberg
       Principles
          APPLICATION BEFORE JUSTICE NADER SITTING AT
      ALICE SPRINGS
        1.  That the appeal against Hook S.M.'s
    refusal to bring the witness Glen Kerr before the
    Court to obtain information and undertakings about
    his return to the jurisdiction be referred to the
    Full Court.
      2.    That the costs of the
    first trial awarded by Kearney J. be fixed at
    $2,700 plus interest at 20% from April '87.
      3.    That the sum of $3,240 be
    paid to the defendant within seven days from this
    order.
      4.    That Lenin Limbo be
    admitted without fee as a Barrister and Solicitor
    of the N.T. for the purpose of conducting the
    defence in Little v Limbo.
      5.    That Lenin Limbo be
    appointed by the Court to act for the defendant in
    Little v Limbo.
      6.    That Lenin Limbo be paid
    $300/wk by the Court for his legal services until
    the 4th day of August 1989.
      7.    That Lenin Limbo be given
    leave to appear before N.T. Courts in ordinary
    clothes.
      8.    That the Solicitor for the
    complainant be directed to accept reverse charges
    phone calls from Lenin Limbo.
      9.    The costs of this
    application fixed at $    .
      TO: The solicitors for the complainant
       (Attorney-General of Australia, Darwin
    Office)
       Attention: R Andruszko
        And to:  Their Agents, N.T. Crown Law, Alice
        Springs.
        This application lodged by Lenin Limbo, 18
    Leichardt Tce, Alice Springs, Messages 5267  (?)"
36.  His Honour simply referred all of those applications to the Full Court.
They can be dealt with summarily.
37.  As to the application in paragraph 1 that the appeal against the decision
of Mr Hook S.M. be referred to the Full Court, His Honour so ordered.
38.  As to the orders sought in paragraphs 2 and 3, we were told that the
question of the costs awarded by Kearney J. had been resolved by agreement and
the agreed amount paid.
39.  The law relating to the admission of legal practitioners is contained in
the Legal Practitioners Act.  None of its provisions have been complied with.
In so far as the application in paragraph 4 is properly before the Full Court
I would dismiss it.
40.  The application in paragraph 5 that this Court appoint the appellant to
act for the appellant is incomprehensible.  The application in paragraph 6
that he be paid $300 per week by the Court for his legal services along with
his application in paragraph 8, that the respondent accept reverse charge
telephone calls from him may be dealt with together.  There is no express
power in the Supreme Court to make any such orders.
41.  As to paragraph 7, seeking leave to appear before the Court in ordinary
clothes is, I suppose, sometimes a matter of courtesy where, for instance,
counsel before a superior court, for some valid reason, is not able to be
properly attired.  I can make no sense of the application in this case, unless
the appellant had anticipated that his application for admission would be
successful and he did not have court attire readily available.  In the
circumstances the question does not arise.
42.  As will appear later, and as the reference to the High Court Rules shows,
the appellant says he is a poor person.  Coupling that proposition with what
he says are the effects of applying the "Nuremberg Principles" and other
matters of international law, he says the Courts have inherent power to make
all kinds of orders, for which no express provision is made by law, to ensure
he is given every facility to present his case.  It will be necessary to
return to that proposition, which underlies all his approaches to the Courts.
43.  His Honour Justice Nader was alive to that general background, and
undoubtedly took the view that it would be better if those matters, which the
appellant regarded as being of such fundamental and predominant importance, be
agitated before the Full Court, rather than for His Honour to decide them and
then there be an appeal, whichever way he determined it.  The reference to the
Full Court provided an expedient way in which those issues could be determined
by a full bench.
Application for Directions
44.  The appellant then made application to His Honour the Chief Justice,
sitting in Alice Springs, in the nature of an application for directions in
regard to the conduct of the proceedings before the Full Court.  That 
    application dated 24 April 1989, reads:
        "APPLICATION TO THE DUTY JUDGE (NUREMBERG
    PRINCIPLES)
    BY THE NOMINAL DEFENDANT, PINE GAP PUBLIC INQUIRY
    For the following orders:
    1.  That certain appeals and applications
    (concerning video,
    disqualification-of-Magistrates-for-bias,
    absconding-witnesses, defendants-in-person, etc)
    as referred to the Full Court recently be heard at
    a Full Court sitting in May 1989.
      2.    That the Full Court
    sitting be at Alice Springs (or, that the N.D.
    have pre-paid expenses of attendance incl. return
    airfare, accommodation, office).
      3.    That the Commonwealth of
    Australia be appointed amicus curiae through the
    officers/offices of the Attorney-General and
    Solicitor-General.
      4.    That the nominal complaint
    be represented by a non-government law-firm (or,
    that the Commonwealth of Australia represent both
    nominal parties).
      5.    That the nominal defendant
    be paid the costs of his preparation in any event
    (hereby fixed at $1,000 to the date of this
    application as an interim assessment and to be
    paid within 7 days).
      6. TIMETABLE
           (1)     That the N.D. lodge
    all written submissions and any further
    applications (an application to amend the appeals
    and applications is hereby foreshadowed) by Friday
    5th May 1989.
       (2)     That the N.A. and
    the amicus curiae lodge all written submissions
    and applications by Friday 19th May 1989.
       (3)     That the F.C.
    sitting be listed for Saturday 27th May 1989 at 10
    am (-1pm, 2pm-5pm).
      7.    That the N.D. be permitted
    (and is hereby authorised) to enter with
    reasonable notice
       (1) Pine Gap
       (2) Alice Springs Court
          with video equipment, cast and crew in
    order to prepare two video tapes for the Full
    Court.
      8.    That the amicus curiae
    attend to all procedural requirements (lodging
    orders for settling, preparation and copying of
    appeal books, etc).
      9.    That a Duty Judge be
    appointed to hear this application in Alice
    Springs on Friday 28th April (or, that N.D. have
    pre-paid costs of attendance).
      10.    That the Duty Judge
    disclose any military, defence or intelligence
    connections.
        This application lodged at Alice Springs on
    Monday 24th April 1989 by Citizen Limbo, Nominee
    Defendant for the PINE GAP PUBLIC INQUIRY.
        (c) Alice Springs Public Interest
    Advocacy Mob ("ASPIAM").
        Note:  ASPIAM is the sole
    authorised representative of the Pine Gap Public
    Inquiry."
    (The emphasis is that of the appellant)
45.  It will be noted that by this stage the appellant was describing himself
as "The Nominal Defendant, Pine Gap Public Inquiry" (at the head of the
document); see also the wording at the foot thereof.  No objection was taken,
and His Honour heard the appellant and counsel for the respondent on 11 May
1989.
46.  His Honour rejected all of those applications and the appellant seeks
leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from those decisions.  There are some
jurisdictional and procedural difficulties about the applications made to and
dealt with by the Chief Justice and I will turn to them later. The Court of
Appeal agreed, by consent, and as a matter of convenience, that the grounds
for a grant of leave be argued contemporaneously with the hearing of the
matters referred.  At the conclusion of all argument the members of the Full
Court reconstituted themselves as the Court of Appeal, and by consent the
arguments going to matters thought to be in that jurisdiction, which had
already been advanced, were adopted by the parties in that Court.
47.  His Honour declined to order that the matters before the Full Court be
listed for hearing in May 1989 (1) and at Alice Springs (2).  He did not
consider that the matters referred should have priority or that the expense of
having the Court sit in Alice Springs was warranted.  He found that the Court
had no express power to order that:
     (a)   the appellant have
    pre-paid expenses to enable him to attend before
    the Full Court in Darwin (2);
     (b)   the Commonwealth be appointed
    amicus curiae (3);
     (c)   the appellant be represented by a
    non-government law firm or that the Commonwealth
    represent both parties (4);
     (d)   the appellant be paid his costs of
    preparation (5).
     (e)   the appellant be permitted to enter
    Pine Gap and the Court House with video equipment,
    cast and crew (7).  It may be noted that only the
    Minister or his delegate has power to permit entry
    to Pine Gap; see Defence (Special Undertakings)
    Act 1952 (Commonwealth) s. 11;
     (f)   an amicus curiae attend to all
    procedural requirements (8);
      He left it to the parties to agree as to a
    timetable for lodging and exchanging written
    submissions (6).
48.  As to the application that the duty Judge hear the applications on 28
April (9), His Honour pointed out that that date had passed.
49.  His Honour declined to order that the duty Judge (who happened to be
himself) disclose any military, defence or intelligence connections, noting
that the question of such disclosure was the subject of a reference to the
Full Court (10).
50.  His Honour also refused an application that arose in the course of
argument, namely that he order that the Clerk of Court and Attorney-General
make available for inspection by the appellant all files concerning arrests,
charges and disposition of cases in the Alice Springs Court arising from
actions at or about Alice Springs for the past ten years concerning trespass
at Pine Gap.
51.  An order was made that the appellant pay the respondent's costs.
52.  It is not necessary for me to go into all of His Honour's reasons.
Clearly His Honour was right in holding there was no express power to make
many of the orders sought; other decisions were of an administrative, not
judicial, nature and not appealable.
Application for Witness Summons
53.  On 27 June the appellant went before Mr McGregor S.M., then sitting in
Alice Springs, seeking the issue of summonses to secure the attendance of
persons at the rehearing in August, and leave to serve out of the jurisdiction
in respect of some of them.
54.  The power of a Justice to issue a summons is relevantly predicated upon
his being satisfied that the person proposed to be summonsed is "likely to
give material evidence" on behalf of either party to a complaint (s. 23
Justices Act - see above).  Before hearing those applications, however, the
learned Magistrate was confronted by applications by the appellant that a crew
from a national commercial television broadcaster be allowed to videotape the
proceedings, and that the appellant be permitted to record the proceedings on
an audio tape recorder. Acknowledging that his Worship had power to regulate
proceedings in his Court, the appellant urged that his applications be granted
upon the grounds of public interest in that there was "literally a life and
death issue here concerning not just one murder, not just five or six murders,
but the murder of a complete civilian population both here and in other cities
which is pretty serious I think".  He went on to assert that "a nuclear
disaster is imminent because of human error and mechanical failure" and
referred to "expressions of concern in opinion polls in the 'Bulletin' in
September of '88 by a reputable opinion poll firm, that fifty one per cent of
Australians do not want foreign bases on their soil".  His Worship adjourned
to consider those applications and after giving reasons decided that the
television crew would not be permitted to video record the proceedings, but
that the appellant could use his audio recorder. The appellant quibbled at the
decision regarding the video recording, but to no avail.  Insofar as those
decisions may be properly before the Full Court by reference, for the reasons
already given I would hold that they may not be questioned here.
55.  During the course of these preliminary applications the appellant
complained that the Clerk of the Court at Alice Springs had refused to issue
the summonses which he then sought to have issued by the Magistrate.  His
Worship said that he had no power over the Clerk and in that I consider he was
right.  Remedies might be available in the Supreme Court arising from an
improper failure of a Clerk to do his duty, but a Magistrate has no such
power.
56.  The appellant then proceeded with his applications regarding the many
summonses.  He presented His Worship with a written outline of his defence
argument and a proposed timetable for the calling of the witnesses he sought
to summons. I will not go into all that now, except to say that he referred to
questions of "international human rights law", "imminent threat of loss of
life", "U.S. global nuclear warfare strategy" and "raising the international
terror level".  He proposed to call the witnesses to prove those points; all
going, he said, to his defence that he had lawful excuse to trespass upon Pine
Gap.  He indicated he proposed to call many of the witnesses to give evidence
via satellite, the cost of which would be borne by the Commonwealth, he
asserted.  Reference was again made to the "Nuremberg Principles"; to the
existence, deployment and use of nuclear weapons as being illegal; and he
advanced his argument as to what he said was the role of Pine Gap in support
of the various wrongs he perceived.
57.  The list of proposed witnesses the appellant sought to have summonsed was
not before the Full Court.  However, some indication can be obtained by
looking at the transcript of the proceedings before Mr McGregor S.M.  The
appellant first mentioned proposed witnesses who would come to the Court of
their own accord including medical, scientific, psychological and educational
experts. As to the proposed summonses, the appellant required the following
witnesses:-
    "The Director of the Alice Springs Emergency
    Service, as to any emergency plan to meet nuclear
    attack on Pine Gap.  The Mayor of Alice Springs,
    relating to the departure from Alice Springs of Mr
    Kerr, the "hidden agenda" as to why Alice Springs
    needs Pine Gap and about the effect of nuclear
    explosion at Pine Gap.  The Chief Minister of the
    Northern Territory; Mr Ede, a member of the
    Opposition in the Legislative Assembly; Mr
    Snowdon, the member for the Territory in the House
    of Representatives, and Mr Crossin of the
    Territory Trades and Labour Council - so that they
    could speak on behalf of the people they
    respectively represent as to "what would happen in
    the event of a nuclear explosion, whether they
    live in terror or under threat or in someway are
    psychologically numb to the fact that Alice
    Springs is a nuclear target".
    Mr Stallings who was said to have
    been the first Chief of Facility at Pine Gap and
    "involved in a secret agreement that was signed
    with some Australians about what the real purpose
    of the base was and how it was set up, and to show
    from its very early days, it was totally for U.S.
    nuclear strategy, its only recently its been
    modified into having some role verifying peace
    agreements". Donald Kingsby who was said to be
    "the new head of Pine Gap".
        Mike Bush, Peter Woodruff and John
    McCarthy who were said to have been Australian
    defence representatives at Pine Gap, since October
    1987.
        Chuck Barber who was said to be the
    head of computer operations at Pine Gap, to show
    that "Australians don't jointly share information,
    contrary to the agreement on Pine Gap with America
    .... to show that there is a history of lies and
    deceit about this base".
        The director of CIA in Langley,
    Virginia as to the role of the CIA in setting up
    the base and "the role it was meant to play in
    terms of espionage and surveillance, both on
    internal Australian affairs, for example, the
    sacking of Gough Whitlam, and on the use of the
    base for current operations around the world ...".
        The 163 Australian citizens said to
    be employed at Pine Gap "to show they mainly work
    as gardeners, maintenance people, and have no role
    in the affairs of the base, to show that in fact
    it's not a joint facility at all, but its very
    much a United States facility, it's a foreign base
    run by a foreign power".
        The Alice Springs airport "to get
    detailed information about the arrivals and
    departures each Monday of the - either the Galaxy
    or the Starlifters and their role in which as you
    know, they are American military aircraft that fly
    in each week, and I would like to get evidence
    that the Alice Springs airport has no idea what
    they carry or what they do, and as to their
    arrival times and departures over the past few
    years".
        The "U.S. chiefs" at each of "Shoal
    Bay in Darwin, North West Cape in Western
    Australia, Nurrungar in South Australia, Cabarlah
    in Queensland, Watsonia in Victoria, Richmond in
    New South Wales and the U.S. Embassy in the ACT
    ... to be questioned about the role of those bases
    in US nuclear war fighting strategy".
        President George Bush,
    "Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed
    Forces" and Premier Mikhael Gorbachev as to their
    "current nuclear war fighting strategies and the
    role of Pine Gap as both nuclear target and
    nuclear targeter".
        Christopher Boyce, who was said to
    be in gaol in Seattle, as to "about how Whitlam
    had to go".
        Victor Marchetti, "an ex CIA
    employee who has written extensively and published
    on the activities of the CIA, particularly he can
    give evidence about the role of the CIA in the
    sacking of Gough Whitlam ...".
        The President of the Canadian Bar
    Association - presumably as to a resolution said to
    have been passed by the Association concerning the
    illegality of nuclear weapons.
        Ken Mant Nath and Lance Best - who
    it was said had recently been through the Court
    defending themselves.  "I mean my point here is
    that we are talking about defendants in person
    with no knowledge of the law, raising legal
    questions and the court not taking any action and
    not directing the prosecutors to take action to
    investigate their allegations".
58.  His Worship took time to consider the applications and on 28 June 1989
dismissed them. In summary, His Worship said in his reasons:
     1.   The appellant sought witnesses to
    prove the illegality of Pine Gap;
     2.   The lawful excuse he wished to
    advance, with the evidence of the proposed
    witnesses, went to his "trespass preventing
    imminent threat to loss of life where imminence is
    (a) 30 minutes away from nuclear attack/holocaust
    (b) human error (c) contributing to U.S. global
    warfare strategy (d) raising the international
    terror level."
     3.   A further ground of defence was a
    lawful duty to prevent breaches of international
    human rights law.
     4.   None of the proposed witnesses
    could give probative evidence, "especially of
    imminent disaster or that the appellant was
    engaged in any activity likely to stop, capable of
    stopping or even designed to stop activity either
    local or of the law of nations (sic)".
     5.   The appellant failed to satisfy him
    that he had a legal right or duty or privilege to
    commit petty offences in order to expose great
    crimes under international law or otherwise.
     6.   The appellant did not know what
    some of the proposed witnesses were likely to say.
     7.   Some of the witnesses were out of
    Australia, others were protected by diplomatic or
    other privilege, and could not be effectively
    served with a summons.
     8.   There was no power whereby
    witnesses could be obliged to give evidence by way
    of satellite television transmission.
59.  It seemed to His Worship that he was being asked to assist the appellant
to do something which was frivolous, contrary to law, oppressive and an abuse
of process of the Court.
60.  The appellant had also asked His Worship for an order directed to the
Clerk of Court to the effect that his direction that Justices of the Peace not
issue summonses was beyond the Clerk's power.  His Worship held that he had no
power to give any such direction.  In that he was clearly right.
61.  It appears that the appellant sought to appeal against the learned
Magistrate's refusal to issue the summonses and give leave to serve those
directed to persons outside the Territory.  No Notice of Appeal was before the
Full Court. However, on the morning that the matters previously referred to
the Full Court were due to commence being heard, the appellant successfully
applied to His Honour the Chief Justice for an order that such appeal be also
referred to the Full Court.  I have already mentioned that it is doubtful that
an appeal lies from such decisions, but need not decide the point.  If it does
lie, it should be dismissed.
Change of rehearing date
62.  On 5 July 1989, the appellant and counsel for the respondent appeared
before Mr Hook S.M. and in light of the pending hearing before the Full Court,
by consent, the dates for the rehearing of the charge against the appellant
were vacated and the matter set down for mention on 18 September. The
appellant did not then object to His Worship dealing with the matter.
Appellant's submissions
63.  Lest I do any injustice to the appellant's oral submissions to the Court
of Appeal, there follows the written submissions which were included by him in
the documents he filed in support of his application for leave to appeal from
the orders of the Chief Justice of 11 May. Though relatively succinct, I
consider they reasonably convey the foundation for his oral submissions which
occupied most of the 5 days before the Full Court.  It will be recalled that
the appellant has legal qualifications and is a practitioner of the Supreme
Court of South Australia and of the High Court of Australia.  The submissions
were used by the appellant both in relation to the application to the Court of
Appeal for leave to appeal and in relation to the issues referred to the Full
Court by the Chief Justice (on appeal from Mr McGregor S.M.) and by Nader J.
        "3. REASONS WHY LEAVE SHOULD BE GIVEN
      REASON ONE
        1. If the Nominal Defendant can prove to a
    court through the testimony of witnesses and other
    expert evidence that:
        #1. The Human Race and the Planet are in danger
    of imminent extinction, or
        #2. That a combination of technological,
    political, military and pschological (sic) factors
    are increasing the risk of nuclear world war and
    therefore "the Human Race and the Planet are in
    danger of imminent extinction" (i.e. FACT #1)
    - some obvious risk-factors such as irresponsible
    governments, use-by-terrorists, escalation,
    irrational behaviour, machine malfunction, human
    error and mistakes are easily-identifiable and
    well-documented; or
        #3. That a "majority" (or, at least, "a number
    sufficient to not decrease the risk of nuclear
    war") of the world population are suffering from
    despair, anxiety, depression, numbness and terror
    as a result of reasonably held beliefs that the
    Human Race and the Planet are in danger of
    imminent extinction (i.e. FACT #1 again) and/or
    that a combination of technological, political,
    military and pschological (sic) factors are
    increasing the risk of nuclear world war (i.e.
    same as FACT #2 -which was a longer way of
    explaining FACT #1: are you following all this?);
      then leave to appeal should be granted
    forthwith for no other reason that you'd be
    failing in your common human responsibility (i.e.
    to protect and preserve life on earth for future
    generations) if you didn't at least see if its
    true.  You'd simply have to take these claims very
    very very seriously and listen to, and act on,
    such evidence.
      REASON TWO
        (a) If we're probably right, then there's no
    time to lose and (b) this is no time to take the
    risk that we are wrong about these facts even if
    there is only a possible probability that we can
    prove these facts.
      REASON THREE
        This "common human responsibility" in reason
    one is also an ancient LEGAL DUTY which neither
    the orders of a Superior Officer nor the Laws of
    any State and not even a Nation's Constitution can
    ever extinguish.
      REASON FOUR
        A correct statement of some of the relevant law to
    be applied in this matter:
    1. The existence and deployment and use of nuclear
    weapons is criminally illegal under
    international/Australian/Northern-Territory/
    indigenous law because they cause (and are
    designed to cause) terror and indiscriminate
    slaughter to non-combatants and the long-term
    poisoning and terminal devastation of the
    indigenous/local/national and global environment.
    2. This criminal illegality includes
    complicity (accessories, aiders and abettors,
    conspiracy, harbouring spies, allegiance to a
    foriegn (sic) power, stupefying, etc).
    3. Nuclear weapons have been criminally illegal
    since their first invention and use 45 years ago
    and all courts have a duty to enforce the
    law against them.
    4. The Rule of Law applies particularly to the
    rich and powerful.
    5. Lenin Limbo has a particular legal duty under
    international, Australian and Northern Territory
    and indigenous law to develop this case:
    (1) legal skills/experience,
    media/public-information-and-education skills,
    (2) personal legal and factual researches and
    therefore his personal knowledge of both the legal
    obligation and the evidence creating this legal
    obligation - especially given his status as a
    White Middle-Aged Anglo-Saxon Straight Male
    (WASMASM) with no dependents and dual
    Australia/USA citizenship,
    (3) middle-class confidence to create a useful
    model (for initiating and conducting future Public
    Interest Litigation by under-resourced low-income
    people seeking to protect and enforce their legal
    rights in the courts under the Rule of Law and
    against the rich and powerful),
    (4) the fact that no-one else more suitable has the
    the (sic) time to do it right now - or, if they
    had the time they didn't have the particular
    cross-over skills and general life-experience to
    see how to do it successfully or even that it
    could at all
    (etc)
    and has at all times acted lawfully
    as the Nominal Defendant ("Nuremberg Principles")
    for the PINE GAP PUBLIC INQUIRY.
    (5). The PINE GAP PUBLIC INQUIRY is entitled
    under international, Australian and Northern
    Territory law in the Alice Springs Court of
    Summary Jurisdiction to a "fair and public hearing
    by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal
    established by the law" and therefore this Court
    must apply the Rule of Law that "all persons shall
    be equal before the courts" and immediately order
    equality of "fair" resourcing in the form of
      (1)   offices,
      (2)   officers,
      (3)   operating budget,
    including comparable communications and mode of
    transport/travel,
      (4)   similar access to
    Government Officials and Employees in the
    preparation of the hearing),
    (etc)
    by appointing the
    international/Australian/Northern Territory
    Governments as "facilitators", providing either
    their own resources (including that of statutory
    authorities and other semi/quasi-government bodies
    like AUSSAT, TELECOM, AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING
    COMMISSION, OMBUDSMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL
    OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, NATIONAL CRIMES AUTHORITY,
    AUSTRALIAN LEGAL AID OFFICE) or cash (including
    pre-payment on invoice) to the Nominal Complainant
    and Nominal Defendant to each independently employ
    legal/public-media-information
    -and-education/government-liason (sic)
    representatives (e.g. in this case, the PINE GAP
    PUBLIC INQUIRY has exercised its right of choice
    by employing the Alice Springs Public Interest
    Advocacy Centre (ASPIAC) as its sole
    representative in all media (including the legal
    system) in exchange for all copyright (including
    TV, Publishing and Merchandising rights) in the
    PINE GAP PUBLIC INQUIRY - this copyright is
    managed by ASPIAR (Alice Springs Public Interest
    Advocacy Records) - and the current full-time
    ASPIAC Case-worker assigned to work on the ASPIAC
    representation of the PINE GAP PUBLIC INQUIRY is
    Lenin Limbo).  (And he is getting very tired and
    stressed out worrying about money-enough for just
    one more week - and general fatigue and anxiety
    from the unbearable
    posible-abandonment-so-I-can-survive-financially
    dilemma).
    (6) There is no reason of morals, public order or
    national security to exclude the Media and/or the
    Public from any part of this trial; and such
    exclusion is not required in the interests of the
    private lives of the parties and there are no
    special circumstances here where publicity would
    prejudice the interests of justice; so it follows
    that both the PINE GAP PUBLIC INQUIRY and the
    Media can video-audio record all proceedings and
    "admit" the public to those proceedings via the
    electronic/ broadcast/satellite media.  The law of
    copyright applies.
    REASON FIVE
    If the law as stated in reason four above is a, or
    an arguably, correct statement of the law as it
    currently exists, then the Appeal to the Federal
    Court is "not bound to fail" (but, in fact and
    law, it should succeed).
    REASON SIX
    Without the determination of this Appeal at the
    earliest opportunity, then logically
        "the Nominal Defendant (and those
    represented by the Defence Case - i.e. the Human
    Race and the Planet, life-on-earth, including this
    Court, you, me)
        "will or may (does'nt (sic) matter
    in this case because you have to weigh up the
    extent of what would definitely happen to all of
    us even if it only "may" happen)
        "suffer (and wer'e (sic) talking
    pretty serious widespread suffering here])
        ""damage for which it would be
    impossible to compensate" (which, in this case,
    means "Armageddon" - THE BIG ONE])".
      (The emphasis is that of the appellant).
64.  Later in those papers he referred to "Grounds of Appeal", as follows:
        "GROUNDS OF APPEAL
    1. The Chief Justice made errors in exercising his
    discretion by:
      (1)    acting upon wrong principles
      (2)    allowing extraneous or
    irrelevant matters to guide and affect him
      (3)    mistaking the facts
      (4)    not taking into account some
    material considerations
      2. The Chief Justice made errors of law.
      3. The Chief Justice made errors of fact."
      "JUDGEMENTS and ORDERS sought by the appellant:
        1. The existence and deployment and use of
    nuclear weapons is criminally illegal under
    international, Australian, Northern Territory and
    indigenous law because they cause (and are
    designed to cause) terror and indiscriminate
    slaughter to non-combatants and the long-term
    poisoning and
    terminal devastation of the indigenous, local,
    national and global environment.
    2. This criminal illegality includes complicity
    (accessories, aiders and abettors, conspiracy,
    harbouring spies, allegiance to a foreign power,
    stupefying, etc).
    3. Nuclear weapons have been criminally illegal
    since their first invention and use 45 years ago
    and all courts have a duty to enforce the law
    against them.
    4. The Full Bench of the Supreme Court of the
    Northern Territory will sit in Alice Springs on
    Saturday 17th June to hear the
    Appeals/Applications (video, etc) and will
    disclose all military, intelligence and defence
    connection in full detail.
    5. The Common-wealth (sic) of Australia is
    appointed Amicus Curiae (friend of the court)
    through the offices/officers of the Australian
    Attorney-and- Solicitor-Generals (sic) to assist the
    Court(s) hearing this case and attend to all
    procedural matters.
    6. The Nominal Complainant be represented by a
    non-government law-firm.
    7. The Nominal Defendant be paid $2,000 within 7
    days on account of the costs of preparing this
    Appeal, the Motion, the Leave to Appeal and the
    Application.
    8. The Nominal Defendant is authorised to enter
    with reasonable notice both Pine Gap and the Alice
    Springs Law Courts with video-recording equipment,
    cast and crew to prepare video-tapes for the Full
    Court hearing.
    9. This Court discloses its military, defence and
    intelligence connections as
    follows:...............
    10. The Chief Justice is to immediately draft (in
    consultation with the Nominal Defendant and
    Nominees) Rules of Court and Practice Directions
    on Defendants-in Person, "Nuremberg" Cases,
    Magistrate's disqualification for bias, absconding
    witnesses and submit these drafts to this Court
    for comment.
    11. The Australian Attorney-General, the Northern
    Territory Attorney-General and the Clerk of the
    Alice Springs Court are to make available for
    inspection (and photocopying by their staff if
    requested by the Nominal Defendant) all files
    concerning arrests, charges and disposition of
    cases in the Alice Springs Courts arising from
    actions at or about Pine Gap for the past 23 years
    (1966).
    12. The Common-wealth (sic) of Australia and the
    Northern Territory and their governments should
    investigate, prepare, lay and prosecute
    informations and indictments for conspiracy/
    complicity in threatened/attempted murder and
    other relevant charges (terrorism, perverting the
    course of justice, etc) under the Crimes Act, the
    Criminal Code and other relevant legislation.
    13. This court congratulates the Nominal Defendant
    (tenacious courage in the face of official/legal/
    judicial inaction) and supports the PINE GAP
    PUBLIC INQUIRY."
65.  Included in the papers was a "Notice of Motion" 
    by which the appellant sought the following:
        "1. This appeal be given #1 Priority in listing
    for hearing and decision.
    2. The time for service of documents for the
    appeal and this motion be abridged.
    3. Full compliance with formal requirements be
    dispensed with or o.k.'d.
    4. Court-collected document lodgement/issue and
    transcript fees be waived (or, payment of fees be
    deferred until further order).
    5. The PINE GAP PUBLIC INQUIRY and ASPIAR (the
    Alice Springs Public Interest Advocacy Records) be
    allowed to make public video-audio recordings of
    all court and courtroom proceedings in this case
    (including this motion and the appeal) and to
    broadcast these recordings on the public
    electronic media.
    6. Invitations and leave to intervene in support
    of these proceedings be directed to the Australian
    Ombudsman, the Northern Territory Ombudsman, the
    Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
    Commission, the National Crimes Authority, the
    Northern Territory Department of Law Prosecutions
    Branch, the Governor-General and Parliament of
    Australia, the Administrator and Legislative
    Assembly of the Northern Territory, all Australian
    State Attorneys-General, the Law Council of
    Australia (for NT Law Society), the Australian
    Legal Aid Office, the Alice Springs Peace Group
    and the Australian Anti-Bases Campaign Coalition."
66.  The essence of the appellant's argument is that:
     1.   Nuclear weapons have always been
    illegal.
     2.   Any strategy for war involving the
    potential use of nuclear weapons is illegal.
     3.   The United States has such nuclear
    weapons and strategy and it is thus acting
    illegally.
     4.   Pine Gap is a facility, the major
    function of which is to assist in that strategy
    and thus it is being used for illegal purposes.
     5.   Australia is complicit in that
    illegality.
     6.   Anyone (including Magistrates and
    Judges) who with knowledge of (or reasonable
    belief in) such illegal activity and who has an
    opportunity to do something about it is a
    potential criminal under
    international law, unless he or she takes
    affirmative measures to prevent the commission or
    continued commission of that crime.
     7.   All of that imposes a duty or
    confers a privilege on everyone (including
    Magistrates and Judges) to break domestic law lest
    their action or inaction be later judged criminal
    under international law.
     8.   He had a lawful excuse for
    trespassing upon Pine Gap, in that he was acting
    in compliance with the dictates of international
    law operating within Australia.
67.  The argument proceeds, so far as Judges and Magistrates are concerned, on
the basis that they are not bound by statutes, the common law or rules of
practice and procedure, but should use their offices in every way so that the
alleged criminal activity is publicly exposed; any person, authority or
government who or which is allegedly involved in the criminal activity or who
or which might be a criminal for failure to perform the duty to do something
about it, must be brought to account and ordered to perform the duty; any
person who prays the aid of a Court to exercise such unfettered power to
expose and bring to account, especially if that person is poor, must be
provided by the Court and if necessary otherwise out of the public purse by
order of the Court, with all resources required to enable that person to
publicly expose the crime.  The duty upon the Courts is such that their powers
in such a case are unlimited.
Nuclear Weapons: Illegality
68.  In 1961, the United Nations General Assembly declared the use of nuclear
weapons to be "a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations", and
in 1972 declared the use of such weapons permanently prohibited.
69.  We were not referred to any treaty or convention which expressly
addresses the legality of the development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons.
There are some treaties which limit the use of such weapons such as the
Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies. Reference might also be made to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
and the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water.  Without having examined these Treaties in detail, it seems
to me that they implicitly acknowledge the existence of nuclear weapons and
are directed to limiting their use.
70.  The proposition as to the illegality of nuclear weapons is advanced upon
the application of the following (for example):
      (1)  Declaration of St. Petersburg 1868,
    which stated that combatants in war may not use
    weapons to "uselessly aggravate the suffering to
    disabled men".
      (2)  Fourth Hague Convention 1907 which
    reaffirmed that the right of belligerents to adopt
    means to injure the enemy was not unlimited and
    that causing "unnecessary suffering" was
    impermissible.  Some commentators include the
    concept of "indiscriminate" within "unnecessary".
      (3)  Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925,
    nuclear radiation and atomic fall out being
    equated with poisonous gases.
      (4)  Hague Draft Rules on Aerial Warfare
    1923, the Geneva Protocol on Humanitarian Law
    applicable in Armed Combat and the Geneva
    Convention 1949 concerning the protection of
    non-combatants.
      (5)  International law prohibiting
    violation by belligerents of the territory of
    neutral states.
      (6)  Genocide Convention, authorised to
    be ratified by Australia pursuant to the Genocide
    Convention Act 1949, confirming that genocide is a
    crime under international law.
(I take these examples from the many articles from a variety of sources relied
upon by the appellant.  They are not intended to be exhaustive).
71.  Whatever may be the merits of these arguments, we were not directed to
any statute of Australia declaring the illegality of nuclear weapons, or of
any strategy for war involving their use.
72.  I pause to mention that serious legal questions arise in this type of
debate going to the possible excuse for the use of nuclear weapons in
circumstances of military necessity, reprisals and self-defence, using,
perhaps, a nuclear device designed to limit fall-out against a legitimate
military target in an area where there are no non-combatants.
Nuremberg Principles
73.  Reference has been made to the appellant's reliance on what he terms "the
Nuremberg Principles" ("Nuremberg" is the spelling I will adopt since it
appears to be the latest English language version of the name of that German
city. Other versions commencing from 1050 AD include Noremberg, Nurburg,
Nurnberg and Nurenberg).  In Volume 2 of the Yearbook of the International Law
Commission for 1950 appears a lengthy report by Special Rapporteur, J.
Spiropoulas, entitled "Formulation of Nurnberg Principles".  The author traces
the history lying behind the attempts of the Commission, at the direction of
the General Assembly of the United Nations, made in 1946, "to treat as of
primary importance plans for the formulation in the context of a general
codification of offences against the peace and security of mankind, or of an
International Criminal Code, of the principles recognized in the Charter of
the Nurnberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal".  By the same
resolution the General Assembly had affirmed the principles of international
law recognized by the Charter and the judgment.  It noted that similar
principles had been adopted in the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal for the trial of major war criminals in the Far East, proclaimed at
Tokyo on 19 January 1946.  On the Nuremberg Charter and trial see generally
"Nuremberg" by M Lippman in Law in Context (1988) Vol. 6(2).
74.  The Commission produced a proposed text of the principles, which is as
follows:
        "A. The principles "Stricto Sensu"
        Principle I. Any person who commits or is
    an
          accomplice in the
    commission of an act which constitutes a crime
    under international law is responsible therefor
    and liable to punishment.
      Principle II. The fact that domestic law
    does not
          punish an act which is an
    international crime does not free the perpetrator
    of such crime from responsibility under
    international law.
      Principle III. The fact that a person who
    committed
          an international crime
    acted as Head of State or public official does not
    free him from responsibility under international
    law or mitigate punishment.
      Principle IV. The fact that a person
    acted
          pursuant to order of his
    Government or of a superior does not free him from
    responsibility under international law.  It may,
    however, be considered in mitigation of
    punishment, if justice so requires.
      Principle V. Any person charged with a
    crime
          under international law
    has the right to a fair trial on the facts and
    law.
      B. The Crimes
           a. Crimes against peace: namely,
          (i) Planning, preparation, initiation or
    waging
        of a war of aggression, or a war in
    violation of international treaties, agreements or
    assurances;
    (ii) Participation in a common plan or
    conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the
    acts mentioned under (i).
       b. War Crimes: namely, violations of
    the
        laws or customs of war.  Such
    violations shall include, but not be limited to
    murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave
    labour or for any other purpose of civilian
    population of or in occupied territory, murder or
    ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on
    the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public
    or private property, wanton destruction of cities,
    towns, or villages, or devastation not justified
    by military necessity.
     c. Crimes against humanity: namely murder,
    extermination, enslavement, deportation and other
    inhuman acts done against a civilian population,
    or persecutions on political, racial or religious
    grounds, when such acts are done or such
    persecutions are carried on in execution of or in
    connexion with any crime against peace or any war
    crime."
75.  The alleged duty of a person having knowledge of illegal activity to take
affirmative measures to prevent it, is nowhere expressed in the draft text.
The appellant relies heavily upon that obligation, both as providing a lawful
excuse for his trespass, and as the foundation for the Courts' powers for
which he contends.  According to the article by Mr Frank Lawrence, "The
Nuremberg Defence", in The Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 40, January 1989, it was
the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal which introduced this concept. The author says
that the statement is dicta, but nevertheless argues that it is evidence of
how expansively individual responsibility may be interpreted.  In his papers
the appellant asserts that the Nuremberg concept is that any person "with
actual knowledge that a crime against humanity (or war crime or crime against
peace) is being committed, and, having such knowledge, was "in a position to
shape or influence the policy that brings about initiation or "continuation"
of the crime" to the extent of his ability .... will be responsible if he
could have influenced such policy and failed to do so."  He cites "Trials of
War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Tribunals 1946-1949, Volume Eleven, pages
448-449".  Unsuccessful attempts have been made to locate that cited source.
No other material available to me indicates that this concept has found its
place in international law.
76.  Justice Ryan in his book "International Law in Australia", 2nd edition,
commencing at p 175 traces the so far unsuccessful attempts to have the Draft
Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind progress through
the United Nations.  There is no Commonwealth legislation supporting the
appellant's claim that he has a right or duty to trespass upon Pine Gap.
77.  It may well be that crimes against peace, war crimes and breaches of the
rules of war are recognised under both customary international law and treaty
law.  Australia acceded to the agreement relating to the Nuremberg trials on 5
October 1945, and enacted its own War Crimes Act in that year, which made
provision for the trial and punishment of ".... violations of the laws and
usages of war" committed during the second World War (Ryan p 157).  However,
on the material available to me I am not prepared to hold that there is any
rule of international law which places a personal responsibility upon an
individual, who knows that any such crime is being committed or planned, to do
everything possible to prevent it.  A fortiori, if the person only suspects,
even on reasonable grounds, that such circumstances exist, I would not be
prepared to read into the personal responsibility concept upon which the
appellant relies an obligation that he trespass upon prohibited land, or a
privilege from prosecution for doing so, contrary to Australia domestic law.
78.  If, contrary to that view, the appellant is obliged by international law
to do whatever is within his power by way of positive measures to prevent the
commission of such a crime against international criminal law, then he will be
able to put what he did to the international court or tribunal trying him, and
it will be up to that body to determine whether the alleged crime was being
planned or committed and whether what the appellant did operated so as to
discharge him from criminal responsibility under international law.
Application of International Law in Australia
79.  Though it is not necessary for me to do so, I refer briefly to various
authorities of the High Court of Australia which indicate to me that if a
defence to a domestic criminal charge is said to arise under international law
then, absent competent legislation, such a defence will not be recognised in
Australian courts.
80.  First, Polites v The Commonwealth (1945) 70 CLR 60. Although "every
statute is to be interpreted and applied, as far as its language admits, as
not to be inconsistent with the comity of nations or with the established
rules of international law ... all the authorities in English law also
recognize that courts are bound by the statute law of that country, even if
that law should violate a rule of international law" (per Latham C.J. at p
68).
81.  "The law of nations, as I understand it, considers that all persons or
things within the territory of a State fall under its territorial supremacy
and are subject to its jurisdiction, legislative, administrative and judicial"
(per Starke J. at p 75).  See also McTiernan J. at p 79.
82.  In Chow Hung Ching v The King (1948) 77 CLR 449 at p 478 Dixon J. adopted
the opinion, with certain exceptions which do not apply here, that a treaty
has no legal effect upon the rights or duties of the subjects of the Crown.
Barwick C.J. and Gibbs J. did not dissent from that view in Bradley v The
Commonwealth (1973) 128 CLR 557 at p 582; and it was adopted by Stephen J. in
Simsek v MacPhee (1982) 148 CLR 636 at p 642: " ... it is for Parliament, and
not for the Executive to make or alter municipal law".
Materiality of the proposed evidence of witnesses sought to be summonsed
83.  The appellant is charged that he, without lawful excuse, trespassed upon
prohibited Commonwealth land.  Proof of any lawful excuse rests on him (Crimes
Act (Commonwealth) s. 89(1)).  The principles of common law with respect to
criminal liability apply in relation to that offence (s. 4).
84.  We were referred by the appellant to the statement of Kirby P. in Jago v
Judges of the District Court (1988) 12 NSWLR 558 at p 569 concerning the
possibility that a source of guidance in the statement of the common law as to
human rights in New South Wales could be found "in international instruments,
prepared by experts, adopted by organs of the United Nations, ratified by
Australia and now part of international law". I refrain from making any
comment on this tentative proposition, except to note that the preconditions
to its applicability have not been shown to exist in this case, either in
relation to the illegality of nuclear weapons as such, or as to personal
responsibility to take affirmative measures.
85.  Upon the material and arguments advanced by the appellant, supplemented
by further research, and taking into account what was put by senior counsel
for the respondent, Mr Riley Q.C., I am quite unable to hold that Mr McGregor
S.M. was wrong in declining to issue summonses for the attendance of the
various persons previously referred to, upon the basis that none of them could
give evidence material to the appellant's proposed defence based upon the
illegality of nuclear weapons, or to his perceived personal responsibility to
take affirmative measures to prevent the commission or continuance of the
alleged crimes against international law.
The defence of necessity at common law
86.  The appellant informed us that as a "fall back position" he proposed to
rely upon the common law defence of necessity, a defence which appears to have
been accepted as being available at common law in Australia.  All of the
circumstances in which it may be properly raised have not been defined so far
as I can tell, but there are examples of it being pleaded in defence to
charges of murder, abortion and escape from prison.  This is not a case in
which I think it is necessary or even desirable to explore the limits of the
defence, and I will confine my remarks to the general principles which seem to
have been accepted and apply them to the circumstances of this case.  In doing
so I am prepared to adopt, for the purposes only of this matter, the
propositions of fact put forward by the appellant. In this Territory the
Parliament has enacted a Criminal Code.  It has no application in this matter
given the provisions of the Crimes Act.  So far as I can tell the common law
on necessity has not been the subject of exposition in the Territory.  There
are no reported cases and I can not find any unreported decisions.
87.  The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in R v Loughnan (1981) VR
443 held that the law recognizes the defence of necessity. Young C.J. and King
J. held at p 448 that the elements of the defence comprised:
     (a)   the criminal act must have been
    done only in order to avoid certain consequences
    which would have inflicted irreparable evil upon
    the accused or upon others whom he was bound to
    protect;
     (b)   the accused must honestly have
    believed on reasonable grounds that he was placed
    in a situation of imminent peril; and
     (c)   the acts done to avoid the imminent
    peril must not be out of proportion to the peril
    to be avoided.
88.  Crockett J. formulated those elements somewhat differently at p 460:
     (a)   the harm, to be justified, must
    have been committed under the pressure either of
    physical forces or exerted by some human agency so
    that an urgent situation of imminent peril has
    been created;
     (b)   the accused must have acted with
    the intention of avoiding greater harm or so as to
    have made
    possible "the preservation of at least an equal
    value"; and
     (c)   there was open to the accused no
    alternative, other than that adopted by him, to
    avoid the greater harm or "to conserve the value".
89.  The appellant contends, on the basis of his readings, that Pine Gap is a
nuclear target, that is, that in the event of war the enemy of the United
States and/or Australia would seek to destroy that place by nuclear weapons.
Further, that even if a state of war did not exist, human or technological
mistake could result in a nuclear weapon being directed there.  In either
event, he says, not only would Pine Gap be destroyed, but the people there
would be killed along with those in the nearby town of Alice Springs.  He also
says that the facilities at Pine Gap can be used so as to direct the nuclear
weapons of the United States upon its enemy.  He also relies upon writings
which suggest that the period of warning of a nuclear attack on Pine Gap,
whether intentional or accidental, would not exceed half an hour.
90.  Through the witnesses he proposes to summons, the appellant hopes to
prove as fact the matters which he has read about and which he says motivated
his trespass.  That is, he wishes to establish, by proving those facts, the
correctness of his beliefs at the time.  I do not consider that to do so is
relevant.  The test of necessity, as formulated by the majority in Loughnan,
is whether he honestly believed on reasonable grounds that he was placed in a
situation of imminent peril, as at the time he trespassed.  In attempting to
show that I do not consider it is relevant or permissible to attempt to prove
facts which were not evident to the offender at the time of the offence.
91.  The learned Magistrate was correct in declining to issue the summonses
proposed to be served on people whose evidence was sought to prove facts
alleged by the appellant, going to his common law defence of necessity, which
alleged facts were not in evidence at the time of the commission of the
offence.
92.  I should say nothing further as to the common law defence of necessity as
it might be advanced for consideration upon the rehearing of the trespass
charge, except to say that the word "certain" in the formulation of the
defence by the majority in Loughnan bears the sense of inevitable, something
bound to happen or which could not otherwise be avoided, as opposed to
something not named or specified.
Miscellaneous matters
93.  In addition to the request to videotape the proceedings before the Full
Court and the request that each of its members disclose military defence or
intelligence connections (already dealt with above), the appellant sought to
call before the Full Court an officer of the Australian Legal Aid Office (an
instrument of the Commonwealth), with a view to finding out why his
application for legal aid had been refused.  That is not a matter justiciable
in the Full Court in these proceedings.  Counsel for the respondent (who also
announced his appearance for the Commonwealth in so far as any of the orders
sought might affect its interests) indicated that there were avenues for
internal review of the officer's decision. Whether such a decision, or a
decision upon a review, may be called in question before the Supreme Court of
the Territory is not something we are called upon to decide.  The appellant's
application to the Full Court was refused.
94.  Coincident with that application the appellant sought an order that the
officer of that Office show cause why the appellant should not be represented
by senior and junior counsel so as to achieve an equality of representation
with those appearing for the respondent and the Commonwealth. The Full Court
has no express power to so order. Whether aid is to be given, and if so what
level of representation is to be provided, is a matter for the Office to
determine.  The Commonwealth Parliament has enacted legislation enabling
review of administrative acts of Commonwealth instrumentalities and officers
of the Commonwealth.  I need not decide whether the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal or the Federal Court has any jurisdiction in relation to the decision
of the Australian Legal Aid Office.  The appellant declined an invitation
extended by the Court to have an adjournment so that he could make further
representations to the Office in support of his application for assistance
before this Court.
95.  The appellant sought orders that the "Australian Ombudsman, the Northern
Territory Ombudsman, the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission, the National Crime Authority, the Northern Territory Department of
Law Prosecutions Branch, the Governor-General and Parliament of Australia, the
Administrator and Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory, all
Australian State Attorneys-General, the Law Council of Australia (for NT Law
Society), the Australian Legal Aid Office, the Alice Springs Peace Group and
the Australian Anti-Bases Campaign Coalition" be given invitations and leave
to intervene in the Full Court.  Apart from his contentions as to the powers
and duties of this Court when the question of nuclear weapons and the
Nuremberg Principles are raised, nothing was put to show how the determination
of the issues before this Court or the Court of Summary Jurisdiction might be
assisted by making any such order, nor as to the powers of this Court to so
order even if it were of the opinion that such assistance would be helpful.
96.  The appellant has taken it upon himself to categorise the Court
proceedings as a public inquiry.  He spoke of the public being enabled to
watch a "show trial" on television for the purpose of educating its members as
to their responsibilities as he saw them.  He sought declarations and orders
from this Court with the intention of drawing those duties to the attention of
the Australian Legal Aid Office, the Australian Broadcasting Commission,
Aussat and Telecom so that the former would be obliged to provide legal and
other resources to enable him to conduct his case at the re-hearing and so
that the latter would "allocate resources necessary to provide a continuous
(and highlights) live telecast via satellite nationwide/ internationally/and
satellite hookups for distance Witnesses here and overseas/for the Pine Gap
Public Inquiry".  He casts himself in the role of a "Nominal Defendant",
representing he says, in effect, all those who are of the same mind.
97.  Frequent mention was made by the appellant of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, especially Article 14(3), relating to the
minimum guarantees of a person facing a criminal charge.  Standing alone the
Declaration does not provide remedies under Australian domestic law if it is
alleged any of the guarantees have been offended.  There is no power in this
Court to enforce the guarantees to be found in the Declaration and we were not
referred to any domestic legislation incorporating any of the guarantees which
it was suggested had been broken, or which provided a means whereby they might
be enforced.
Procedural matters
98.  A Judge hearing proceedings may refer it or any part of it to the Full
Court.  It is up to the Full Court to accept or decline the reference and it
may make such orders and give such direction as it thinks fit in relation to
the procedure to be followed (s. 21 Supreme Court Act).
99.  As to the mode of application to the Full Court, r. 65.02 (1)(a) provides
that it shall be in such manner as the Judge who is referring the matter
directs.  Justice Nader made orders, in effect, that the application be made
by preparation and filing of documents in the nature of appeal books.
100.  The Full Court gave a number of directions during the course of the
hearing particularly given the confusing nature of the material before it, as
to the order in which the various issues should be dealt with.
101.  With respect, I doubt that His Honour the Chief Justice had jurisdiction
to entertain the applications made to him by the appellant, in so far as they
were in the nature of directions for the conduct of proceedings before the
Full Court. It is doubtful therefore that any appeal or application for leave
to appeal lies from His Honour's decisions; (ss. 51 and 53 Supreme Court Act).
102.  However, the Full Court and Court of Appeal severally entertained all
issues raised by the appellant without objection.  For the sake of
completeness I would therefore treat the appellant's arguments said to arise
from His Honour's decisions as being arguments addressed to the Full Court in
the first instance and would waive compliance with the Rules in so far as it
is necessary to do so.
103.  I would make the following orders and declarations:
     Full Court
     1.   That the "appeal" from the decision
    of Mr Hook S.M. refusing to issue a warrant for the
    arrest of Mr Kerr be struck out, or if properly
    instituted, dismissed.
     2.   That the question "whether a Judge
    or Magistrate has an obligation to answer
    questions of a litigant concerning matters which
    may disqualify him if the litigant knew about
    them, for example military, defence or
    intelligence connections", be answered "No".
     3.   That the "appeal" from the decision
    of Her Worship Ms Thomas C.S.M., refusing to allow
    the appellant to record the August proceedings in
    the Court of Summary Jurisdiction by video and
    audio equipment, be struck out.
     4.   That the application of the
    appellant for permission to record the proceedings
    of this Court by video or audio equipment, be
    refused.
     5.   That there is no power in a
    Magistrate to make any order waiving fees
    prescribed by the Regulations to the Justices Act.
     6.   That the "appeal" from the decision
    of Mr Hook SM not to disqualify himself from
    hearing all interlocutory applications relating to
    the August hearing be struck out, or if properly
    instituted, dismissed.
     7.   That the appellant's application
    for admission without fee as a Barrister and
    Solicitor for the purpose of conducting a defence
    in the Court of Summary Jurisdiction be refused.
     8.   That the appellant's applications
    that he be appointed to act for himself; that he
    be paid $300 per week by the Court and that the
    respondent be ordered to accept reverse charge
    telephone calls, be refused.
     9.   That in so far as there was any
    "appeal" against the decision of Mr McGregor S.M.
    refusing to issue summonses upon the appellant's
    application to him, it be struck out, or if
    properly instituted, dismissed.
     10.   That the application that the
    decision of an officer of the Australian Legal Aid
    Office refusing legal aid to the appellant be
    reviewed, be struck out.
     11.   That the appellant's application
    that various organisations be given leave to
    intervene be refused.
     12.   That the appellant pay the
    respondent's costs.
     Court of Appeal
      That leave to appeal from the decisions of His
    Honour the Chief Justice of 11 May 1989 be
    refused.
      That the appellant pay the respondent's costs.