PARTIES: PLUMMERS BORDER VALLEY ORCHARDS PTY LTD (ATF THE PLUMMERS BORDER VALLEY ORCHARD UNIT TRUST)
v
COMMISSIONER OF TAXES
TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION: SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION
FILE NO: LA3 of 2002 (20201485)
DELIVERED: 29 MAY 2002
HEARING DATES: 8 MAY 2002
JUDGMENT OF: RILEY J
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant: Ms A Macdonald
Respondent: Ms J Kelly
Solicitors:
Appellant: Cridlands
Respondent: Christopher Frey
Judgment category classification: B
Judgment ID Number: ril0214
Number of pages: 19
ril0214
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN
Plummers Border Valley Orchards v Commissioner of Taxes [2002] NTSC 33
No. LA3 of 2002
BETWEEN:
PLUMMERS BORDER VALLEY ORCHARDS PTY LTD
(ATF THE PLUMMERS BORDER VALLEY ORCHARD UNIT TRUST)
Appellant
AND:
COMMISSIONER OF TAXES
Respondent
CORAM: RILEY J
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 29 May 2002)
[1] The appellant, Plummers Border Valley Orchards Pty Ltd ("Plummers
Border") is the trustee for the Plummers Border Orchard Unit Trust which
operates an apple orchard in Lenswood in South Australia and a stall at the
Pooraka wholesale fruit and vegetable market in that State. The units in the
Trust are held equally by trustees for four discretionary Trusts, namely: B
A Plummer Nominees Pty Ltd as trustee for the Bruce Plummer Family Trust; J
S Plummer Nominees Pty Ltd as trustee for the John Plummer Family Trust; I L
Plummer Pty Ltd as trustee for the Ian Plummer Family Trust; and James Plummer
Nominees Pty Ltd as trustee for the James Plummer Family Trust. The directors
of the trustee company Plummers Border, are Bruce Plummer, John Plummer, James
Plummer and Ian Plummer.
[2] Prior to 1984, Tully Distributors Pty Ltd, inter alia, purchased produce
from Plummers Border, transported it to Alice Springs and distributed the produce
in the region. In 1984 the manager of Tully Distributors, Mr Stupple, and Plummers
Border agreed to purchase the business of Tully Distributors. This was achieved
by the establishment of the Stummer Unit Trust. The trustee of that Trust was
Tully Distributors Pty Ltd and the holders of the units in the Trust were Stupple
Nominees Pty Ltd as trustee for the Stupple Family Trust (50%) and BA Plummer
Nominees, J S Plummer Nominees and I L Plummer Nominees (between them 50%).
The Directors of Tully Distributors were John Plummer, Ian Plummer, William
Stupple and his wife Ann Stupple. After the purchase Plummers Border continued
to act as the South Australian purchasing agent of Tully Distributors.
[3] Around 1990 the Plummer family and Mr and Mrs Stupple agreed to establish
a separate business, TD Produce, to undertake the buying of fruit and vegetables
in South Australia and to transport those and other goods by road to Alice Springs.
The TD Produce Unit Trust was established with TD Produce Pty Ltd as the trustee.
The directors of the trustee company were Ann Stupple, William Stupple, John
Plummer and Bruce Plummer. The unit holders in the Trust were B A Plummer Nominees
Pty Ltd, J S Plummer Nominees Pty Ltd, I L Plummer Nominees Pty Ltd and James
Plummer Nominees Pty Ltd (as to 49.6%), Bruce Daw (0.4%) and Garden Grove Pty
Ltd (50%). The directors and shareholders of Garden Grove Pty Ltd were Mr and
Mrs Stupple. Mr Daw was an ex employee of Plummers Border.
[4] In the period between February 1995 and January 1998 TD Produce purchased
less than 8% of its produce from Plummers Border. The major part of its produce
was obtained from independent third parties. It also freighted goods other than
fruit and vegetables to Alice Springs. The appellant described the business
of TD Produce as a "stand alone" business. Tully Distributors made
no purchases from Plummers Border during the period.
[5] During the period Plummers Border provided administrative services to TD
Produce. It carried out bookkeeping, invoicing, accounts payable and pay-roll
services. It did so at commercial rates and in circumstances that allowed it
to use spare staff capacity. Plummers Border also shared space in a market stall
at Pooraka with TD Produce. Again this was at commercial rates and allowed Plummers
Border to make productive use of space excess to its requirements.
The Assessment
[6] The Commissioner of Taxes issued an assessment of pay-roll tax to Tully
Distributors in respect of the period 1 February 1995 to 31 January 1998. In
so doing the Commissioner determined that Plummers Border, Tully Distributors,
TD Produce, Stupple Nominees, Garden Grove and the Plummer Family Trustee Corporations
constituted a Group for the purposes of the Act by virtue of the provisions
of Part IVA of the Act. Plummers Border objected to the assessment pursuant
to s 34 of the Pay-roll Tax Act. It was not, and is not, in issue that Plummers
Border had the requisite standing to object. It challenged the decision that
the identified corporate entities constituted a Group. Alternatively it contended
that Plummers Border should have been excluded from the Group pursuant to s
17H of the Act.
[7] The objection was considered by the Commissioner and for reasons set out
in detail in a letter dated 23 November 2001, he disallowed the objection. Plummers
Border has now appealed to this Court pursuant to the provisions of s 35 of
the Pay-roll Tax Act. There is no longer any challenge to the decision of the
Commissioner that a Group existed. The appeal was limited to the failure of
the Commissioner to exclude Plummers Border from the Group.
The Nature of the Appeal
[8] An appeal to the Supreme Court pursuant to s 35 of the Pay-roll Tax Act
requires the appellant to show that the decision of the Commissioner was wrong
at the time it was given upon the material then before the Commissioner. The
appellant is limited to the grounds stated in its objection. If the Court finds
a relevant error on the part of the Commissioner it will review the original
material for itself and determine the question upon that material alone: Crusher
Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes (NT) (1994) 94 ATC 4646 per Martin
CJ at 4653; Ngurratjuta Pmara Ntjara Aboriginal Corporation v Commissioner of
Taxes (NT) (2000) 155 FLR 146 at 148; John French Pty Ltd v The Commissioner
of Pay-roll Tax (1984) 1 Qd R 125 at 129; The Ballarat Brewing Company Ltd v
Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (Vic) (1979) 79 ATC 4452 at 4459.
[9] In deciding whether the Commissioner was in error, guidance can be obtained
from the observations of Dixon J in Avon Downs Pty Ltd v The Federal Commissioner
of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353 at 360 where his Honour said:
"If (the Commissioner) does not address himself to the question which the
sub-section formulates, if his conclusion is affected by some mistake of law,
if he takes some extraneous reason into consideration or excludes from consideration
some factor which should affect his determination, on any of these grounds his
conclusion is liable to review. Moreover, the fact that he has not made known
the reasons why he was not satisfied will not prevent the review of his decision.
The conclusion he has reached, may on a full consideration of the material that
was before him, be found to be capable of explanation only on the ground of
some such misconception."
The Issue for Determination
[10] The Commissioner determined that Plummers Border was a member of the Group
for the purposes of Part IVA of the Pay-roll Tax Act. On appeal there was no
issue that such a Group existed by virtue of the common control provisions of
the Act. However, Plummers Border sought to be excluded from the Group pursuant
to the provisions of s 17H of the Act which section was, at the relevant time,
in the following terms:
17H. EXCLUSION OF PERSONS FROM GROUPS
(1) Where the Commissioner is satisfied, having regard to the nature and degree
of ownership or control of the businesses, the nature of the businesses and
any other matters that he considers relevant, that a business carried on by
a member of a group is carried on substantially independently of, and is not
substantially connected with the carrying on of, a business carried on by any
other member of that group, the Commissioner may, by order in writing served
on that first-mentioned member, exclude him from that group.
[11] It was the submission of Plummers Border to the Commissioner that it ought
be excluded from the Group because the business of Plummers Border was carried
on substantially independently of other members of the Group and because it
was not substantially connected with a business of any other member of the Group
during the relevant period. The decision of the Commissioner not to exclude
Plummers Border from the Group was expressed in the following terms:
"Having regard to the nature and degree of ownership or control of the
businesses carried on by Plummers Border and the other members of the disputed
Group, the nature of the respective businesses carried on by the members of
the disputed Group and the other relevant matters set out above, it is my view
that the business carried on by Plummers Border:
(i) was carried on substantially independently of the businesses carried on
by the other corporate entities comprising the disputed Group during the relevant
period of time;
and
(ii) was substantially connected with the carrying on of the businesses carried
on by the other corporate entities comprising the disputed Group during the
relevant period of time.
In arriving at this conclusion, I have borne in mind that (i) above appears
to relate to the independence of the businesses, and requires an examination
of the connection between the business activities, and that (ii) above appears
to relate to connection in management, notwithstanding the reservation of his
Honour Justice McPherson in John French Pty Ltd v The Commissioner of Pay-roll
Tax (supra) as to whether the distinction between (i) and (ii) was 'readily
apparent'."
[12] It can be seen from the above reasons that the Commissioner accepted that
the business carried on by Plummers Border was in fact carried on substantially
independently of the businesses carried on by the other corporate entities comprising
the disputed Group. The appellant does not contend that this conclusion was
in error and, for present purposes, it need not be further considered. In the
event that it be found that the Commissioner erred in making his decision, then
it would be a matter for the Court to determine for itself whether or not the
business was carried on substantially independently of the businesses carried
on by the other corporate entities.
[13] For the moment it is only necessary to consider whether the Commissioner
was in error in refusing to exercise his discretion to exclude Plummers Border
from the Group because Plummers Border had not shown, on the balance of probabilities,
that the business was not substantially connected with the carrying on of a
business carried on by the other corporate entities comprising the Group.
Section 17H Pay-roll Tax Act
[14] Section 17H of the Pay-roll Tax Act and its equivalent provisions in other
jurisdictions have been the subject of judicial attention.
[15] The fact that ownership and control are among the factors which operate
to produce a group for the purposes of the Act means such factors alone are
not sufficient to prevent exclusion under s 17H: John French Pty Ltd v The Commissioner
of Pay-roll Tax (1984) 1 Qd R 125 at 141; Mead Packaging (Aust) Pty Ltd v Commissioner
of Pay-roll Tax (NSW) (1978) 78 ATC 4164 at 4173. However the extent of control
may be a relevant factor in particular circumstances.
[16] In Mead Packaging (supra) Rath J said (at 4172):
"Section 16H(1) requires two findings to be made, namely (1) that a business
carried on by the plaintiff (as a member of a group) is carried on substantially
independently of a business carried on by any other member of that group; and
(2) that the business is not substantially connected with the carrying on of
the business carried on by the other member of the group. The first limb appears
to relate to the independence of the businesses, and requires an examination
of the connection between the business activities. The second limb appears to
relate to connection in management. At all events the composite expression used
in the subsection requires a consideration of the businesses and their control,
and a finding of substantial independence and substantial absence of connection."
[17] Those words have been adopted in a number of cases eg Crusher Holdings
Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes (supra); Denham Constructions Pty Ltd &
Anor v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (NSW) (1998) 99 ATC 4139 at 4146.
[18] The word "substantially" does not have a fixed meaning. What
is required to demonstrate that a business is "not substantially connected"
with another business is a matter of fact and degree to be considered in all
of the circumstances. It calls for the exercise of judgment. The connection
must be actual and of substance. It must not be minimal yet need not be total.
[19] It is to be noted that in the present matter the appellant did not argue
that the Commissioner addressed the wrong question, but rather complained of
the Commissioner's method of addressing the question.
The Submissions of the Appellant.
[20] It was the submission of the appellant that the Commissioner made several
errors of law in refusing to exercise his discretion to exclude the plaintiff
from the Group. It was submitted that the Commissioner erred in a number of
identified ways. Those suggested errors were addressed in various documents
provided by the appellant and respondent including statements of facts, issues
and contentions filed by each and written outlines of submissions.
Substantial Control and/or Influence
[21] The appellant submitted that the Commissioner erred in finding that "not
only were the ultimate owners of the disputed Group in a position to exercise
substantial control and/or influence over the conduct of the businesses carried
on by the members of the disputed Group, but that they did in fact do so".
The appellant contended that the Commissioner erred in relying upon inference
rather than what it described as "the actual facts involved".
[22] Reference to the reasons for decision provided by the Commissioner reveal
that he considered this matter in some detail. He made reference to the shareholdings
and directorships of the corporate entities that made up the Group. He noted
there was a mutuality of directors and shareholders during the relevant period
and he detailed the factual matters that supported that observation. There is
no challenge to those findings and the evidence before the Commissioner supported
his conclusions. The Commissioner noted in relation to the day to day management
of the trading corporations that Bruce Plummer was the managing director of
Plummers Border and he jointly managed TD Produce with William Stupple who was
also responsible for the management of Tully Distributors. He then referred
to the various shareholdings and directorships of members of the Group to reach
the conclusion that the identified persons were in a position to exercise substantial
control and/or influence over the conduct of the businesses carried on by members
of the Group. As to his conclusion that they in fact did so he identified the
factors upon which he relied. These involved the obligations imposed upon directors
of the corporate entities to remain informed about the respective corporate
activities in order to participate in the overall management of the affairs
of those corporations; the fact that the directors and shareholders were all
"close members of either the Stupple or Plummer families"; and the
fact that the directors and ultimate shareholders of the various corporate entities
comprising the Group were ultimately and substantially the same. He drew what
he described as "a logical inference" that the business operations
of each member of the Group would be influenced by the shareholders and directors
in such a way as to maximise any advantage to the businesses of other members
of the Group. The fact that this occurred can be seen from the fact that each
of Plummers Border and Tully Distributors shifted some of the functions of their
existing business to the new company and, when that company was created, Plummers
Border was able to increase its efficiency by providing benefits to TD Produce
that made use of excess space and excess staff capacity within Plummers Border.
[23] The reasons for the Commissioner reaching his conclusion have been set
out in detail by him. That conclusion was based upon, and available from, the
evidence before him and, in my view, no error has been demonstrated.
Failure to Consider Relevant Matters
[24] It was the submission of the appellant that the Commissioner had taken
into account irrelevant considerations and had failed to take into account relevant
considerations. In considering this submission it must be borne in mind that
the Commissioner was dealing with matters additional to the issue now before
me. He also had before him the questions of whether the identified entities
constituted a Group and whether the business carried on by Plummers Border was
carried on substantially independently of the other businesses.
[25] The first matter raised by the appellant was the submission that the Commissioner,
in the process of making his decision, erred in failing to consider that the
family trustee companies, which were declared and accepted to be members of
the Group, had no employees and no liability for pay-roll tax. They did not
trade or carry on business themselves. In fact, in the course of his written
reasons for decision, the Commissioner distinguished between the corporations
that "carry on a business in the ordinary meaning of the word" and
the family trustee companies which, he said, "carry on businesses of investment
in units in the unit trusts under which the Plummers Border, Tully and TD Produce
businesses are carried on." The Commissioner observed that the family trust
companies carried on the business of investing in the trading corporations "and
are complementary or ancillary to the latter businesses in that they operate
as a method for the distribution of profits from the employer corporations businesses".
That was a matter he considered in obtaining "the overall picture from
the accumulation of detail". I note that the inclusion of the family trusts
in the Group is not subject to challenge in these proceedings and the only issue
is whether Plummers Border should be excluded from that Group. There is no complaint
that the Commissioner misdescribed the family trustee companies. He did not
suggest that they had employees or liability for pay-roll tax. Their position
within the Group was a relevant matter to be considered when determining whether
Plummers Border was "substantially connected with the carrying on of a
business carried on by any other member of that group" (s 17H(1)).
[26] The appellant further contended that the Commissioner should not have taken
into account the fact that income from the family trust companies, which was
in turn derived from the businesses carried on by Plummers Border, Tully Distributors
and TD Produce, was distributed to Plummers Border .
[27] In considering whether or not a business is substantially connected with
the carrying on of a business carried on by any other member of a group, it
is, in my opinion, relevant to observe that part of the income from the profit
of those businesses is received by the entity concerned. It is one matter to
be taken into account in combination with many others in determining whether
there is a substantial connection between the businesses.
[28] The appellant submitted that the Commissioner should not have taken into
account the fact that Tully Distributors and TD Produce registered as a Group
for the purposes of pay-roll tax in South Australia. This is also a matter which
is relevant to a consideration of the issue of whether there is a substantial
connection. The relationship between those two businesses is a matter of interest
when looking at the position of Plummers Border. TD Produce was managed by Bruce
Plummer and William Stupple. Tully Distributors was managed by William Stupple
and Plummers Border by its Managing Director, Bruce Plummer. As the appellant
submitted the joint management of TD Produce reflected the fact that this business
was in effect a joint venture between the Plummer and Stupple families.
[29] The close relationship between Tully Distributors and TD Produce as recognised
by them registering as a Group in South Australia, is a matter the Commissioner
was entitled to take into account when coming to the conclusion that "a
logical inference can be drawn that the business operations of each member of
the group would be influenced
in such a way as to maximise any advantage
to the businesses of other members of the disputed Group."
[30] It is clear that the members of the Group worked together to maximise profits.
An example of this is to be found in the decision of TD Produce to utilise and
pay for the spare capacity of Plummers Border's staff for its essential administrative
services instead of obtaining assistance in the market place. The closeness
of the relationship between the three companies was obviously important. Whilst
the appellant pointed to the fact that there was no direct trade between Plummers
Border and Tully Distributors the Commissioner was entitled to take into account
that there were sales of produce from Plummers Border to TD Produce in circumstances
where TD Produce was established to act as the purchasing agent for Tully. The
closeness of the relationship between Tully Distributors and TD Produce was
a legitimate factor to bear in mind when considering the whole of the relationship
between the businesses of the three corporate entities and, further, whether
Plummers Border should be excluded from the Group.
[31] The Commissioner correctly concluded that there was a "commonality
in the nature of the businesses of the disputed Group". The "trading"
businesses operated within the same industry and were each part of a chain of
distribution of foodstuffs, especially fruit and vegetables. The family trustee
entities were encompassed in that commonality by virtue of their interest in
the various trading companies.
[32] The appellant further contended that the Commissioner ought not to have
taken into account the fact that TD Produce was established to act as Tully
Distributors' purchasing agent in South Australia and for it to undertake the
transport of goods to Alice Springs, an operation previously undertaken by Tully
Distributors. Again, these matters are relevant to the degree of connection
and interdependency between the three businesses. The businesses were each links
in the chain of growth and distribution of food stuffs, especially fruit and
vegetables. Each of Plummers Border and Tully Distributors benefited from the
creation of TD Produce and each shifted some of the functions of their existing
business to the new company. It must be assumed that this was for the overall
benefit of the businesses within the Group. The positions occupied by the businesses
in the chain of growth and distribution of produce is such as to avoid competition
between them. The relationships enabled each member of the Group to maximise
advantages available to the businesses of other members in the Group. The profits
of those businesses flowed to the relevant family trusts. The arrangements for
the management of the businesses enabled the businesses to be conducted efficiently
for the benefit of the Group and to maximise the profitability for all members
of the Group.
Inappropriate Weight
[33] The appellant complained that the Commissioner gave inappropriate weight
to various factors. It was submitted that despite stating otherwise, the Commissioner
failed to properly consider the balancing factors.
[34] In order to succeed on this ground the appellant must demonstrate that
the approach of the Commissioner amounted to an error. It is difficult to see
how that could be so. It is incumbent upon the Commissioner to consider all
relevant matters, but when doing so it is a matter for the Commissioner to decide
what weight is to be attached to the factors considered. As I observed in Ngurratjuta
Pmara Ntjara Aboriginal Corporation v Commissioner of Taxes (supra) at 149:
"It must be remembered that it is the Commissioner, not the Court, who
must be satisfied that the requirements of s 9(a) have been met. It is the decision
of the Commissioner that he is not satisfied that is examined on appeal. The
Court does not substitute its view for that of the Commissioner. It will only
interfere if the Commissioner errs in the sense discussed by Dixon J in Avon
Downs Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Commonwealth) (at 360)."
[35] The same observation applies in this case. Provided the Commissioner takes
into account the relevant considerations and does not take into account irrelevant
matters, the weight that he accords to various factors is a matter for him.
In those circumstances his decision would not be interfered with unless the
result is so unreasonable as to demonstrate that he must have failed in the
discharge of his function according to law. Whilst it may not appear how the
Commissioner has reached the result embodied in his decision, if upon a consideration
of the whole of the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust then this Court
may infer that there has in some way been a failure properly to exercise the
discretion: Lovell v Lovell (1950) 81 CLR 513 at 518-519; House v The King (1936)
55 CLR 499 at 504-505.
[36] In this matter the appellant has not identified the manner in which it
is said that inappropriate weight was given to any particular factor. In my
view it cannot be said that the decision of the Commissioner was unreasonable
in the sense discussed above.
Legislative Purpose
[37] The appellant complained that the Commissioner failed to consider the anti-avoidance
purpose of grouping entities and failed to properly consider the concessionary
nature of the exclusion provided for in s 17H of the Pay-roll Tax Act. The effect
of s 17H is to ameliorate any absurd or unjust operation of the grouping provisions
of the Act and, it was submitted, should be approached accordingly. The section
is "intended to provide a balance" against unintended groupings and
"to prevent injustice from being done in particular cases": Baxter
& Anor v Chief Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (1986) 7 NSWLR 122 at 131.
[38] There was nothing identified by the appellant in the decision of the Commissioner
that suggested that the Commissioner misdirected himself in this regard or misunderstood
the nature of the task to be undertaken by him. Reference to the decision itself
shows that the Commissioner applied the terms of s 17H and considered all relevant
matters.
[39] The appellant submitted that the Commissioner failed to consider the relationship
of each of the businesses of the members of the Group to Plummers Border. Reference
to the reasons for decision demonstrates that this was not the case. The reasons
for decision identified each of the businesses and their relationship to each
other. This was done by reference to the nature of the businesses carried on
rather than by reference to the individual members of the Group. I see no error
in so proceeding.
[40] It was further submitted that the Commissioner inferred actual control
from "pure ownership" of the various businesses. Again this proposition
cannot be demonstrated by reference to his reasons. The Commissioner did take
into account matters relating to ownership along with the identity of, and obligations
accepted by, the directors. He also took into account the relationship of the
directors to each other. In the matters placed before the Commissioner there
was information regarding the management role of the directors and, in particular,
Bruce Plummer and William Stupple. These were matters that he was entitled to
take into account and did so. The Commissioner also looked at the voting power
of the trustee companies and the identity of those who controlled the distribution
of income being those persons who were the directors of the trustee companies.
The directors and shareholders of the trustee corporations were the same people
as the directors and shareholders of the trading companies. They were also the
potential beneficiaries under the discretionary trusts. It is clear that the
Commissioner took into account all relevant factors and then stood back and
considered "the overall picture".
[41] In my opinion the appellant has not demonstrated that the Commissioner
erred in reaching his decision. The appeal is dismissed.
___________________