CITATION: Paul Francis Tudorstack v Zoey Louise Kristiansen Bach and Joshua
Craig Mason [2003] NTMC 025
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PARTIES: Paul Francis Tudor-Stack
(Informant)
v
Zoey Louise Kristiansen Bach and
Joshua Craig Mason
(Defendants)
TITLE OF COURT: Court of Summary Jurisdiction
JURISDICTION: Criminal
FILE NO(s): 20219158; 20219159
DELIVERED ON: 21 May 2003
DELIVERED AT: Darwin
HEARING DATE(s): 13, 14 May 2003
JUDGMENT OF: Jenny Blokland SM
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW - DEMANDING WITH MENACES - Director of Public Prosecutions Reference
No.1 of 2002 [2002] NTCCA 11; Tripodi v R (1961) 104 CLR 512; Austin v The Queen
(1989) 166 CLR 669; Thorne v Motor Traders Association [1937] AC 797; R v Clear
[1968] QB 670; Benasic v The Queen (1987) 77 ALR 340; John Rae (1998) 104 A
CrimR 348; Criminal Code (NT) ss 1, 31,228;
C R Williams, "Property Offences" 3rd ed (1999) LBC
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Prosecutor: Mr Johnson
Defendants: Ms Bennett
Mr Jobson
Solicitors:
Prosecutor: Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
Defendants: Northern Territory Legal Aid Commission
Judgment category classification: B
Judgment ID number: [2003] NTMC 025
Number of paragraphs: 21
IN THE COURT OF SUMMARY JURISDICTION
AT DARWIN IN THE NORTHERN
TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA
No. 202119158, 20219159
BETWEEN:
Paul Francis Tudor-Stack
(Informant)
v
Zoey Louise Kristiansen Bach and
Joshua Craig Mason
(Defendants)
REASONS FOR DECISION
(Delivered 21 May 2003)
Jenny Blokland SM:
Introduction
1. The defendants are jointly charged that on 17 December 2002, with intent
to obtain some benefit,[they] made a demand, namely a prescription for methadone,
from Sujeewa Fernando, with menaces: Contrary to s 228 Criminal Code (NT). Section
228 reads as follows:
"228. Blackmail and extortion
(1) Any person who makes any demand with menaces with intent to obtain some
benefit for himself or another or to cause some detriment or injury to another
is guilty of a crime and is liable to imprisonment for 14 years.
(2) It is a defence to a charge of a crime defined by this section to prove
that the making of such demand was reasonable by the standards of an ordinary
person similarly circumstanced to the accused person.
Menace is defined in the Criminal Code, s 1 as:
"menace" includes a threat of an injury, accusation or detriment of
any kind to be caused or to be made against any person either by the offender
or by any other person if the demand is not complied with;"
2. Sujeewa Fernando is a medical practitioner employed at the Night and Day
surgery, Casuarina. Her honesty as a witness is not in question. She made a
number of concessions favourable to the defendants' case both in her evidence
in chief and in cross-examination. This summary of her evidence incorporates
both parts of her evidence.
3. Dr Fernando was working on the evening of December 17, 2002. She was due
to finish work that evening at 9.00 pm. The other staff employed at the Night
and Day surgery, save for Ms Crisp, ( the receptionist), had gone home. Ms Crisp,
(who gave evidence in the proceedings), did not notice anything unusual about
the two defendants. At around 6.30 - 7.00pm Dr Fernando called the defendant
Bach to come into her consulting room. Dr Fernando told the court that Ms Bach
said that her partner, (the defendant Mason), had the same problem and she asked
if he could come in at the same time. Dr Fernando consented to this. Dr Fernando
thought his name was Jason and referred to him as Jason throughout the proceedings.
Nothing turns on this. Both defendants went into Dr Fernando's consulting room.
4. The defendant Bach was seated close to Dr Fernando at the desk. The defendant
Mason was seated close to the door of the entrance of the consulting room, although,
from the photos tendered into evidence, it looks as though he was still quite
close. Estimates given of this distance in court were around two metres. Ms
Bach explained she was in rehab and wanted to get off of drugs. She had the
phone number of the Royal Darwin Hospital's drug rehabilitation unit. Dr Fernando
telephoned the unit but being after usual hours, there was no answer. She confirmed
that the phone number she was given was the number of the unit. She also agreed
the defendant Bach told her that they had a drug problem and that they had been
told by the hospital to consult a GP about obtaining a prescription for methadone.
Dr Fernando thought they were genuine.
5. Dr Fernando told the court Ms Bach said she had pain in the ribs. She said
she wanted methadone. Ms Bach was speaking rapidly but in a friendly manner.
Dr Fernando told Ms Bach she could give panadeine forte for the pain. At that
point, both defendants told her it was rubbish; that they didn't want that form
of treatment. The defendant Bach said she didn't think Dr Fernando was going
to help [her]. Dr Fernando said she would not prescribe methadone to them; the
defendant Bach produced a bottle from the Katherine pharmacy, a brand of methadone
and said words to the effect: if this doctor can prescribe methadone, why can't
you? Dr Fernando does not prescribe methadone. She chooses to deal with patients
in this situation by sending them to the hospital rehabilitation unit. Dr Fernando
agrees she did not examine Ms Bach concerning the pain; she did not take her
blood pressure; she agreed if the defendant Bach had been using opiate based
drugs for pain relief, it was likely she would have a higher tolerance to pain
relief drugs. She did not think her pain was genuine, partly it seems, because
of the unstable history of a drug dependant patient.
6. The defendant Bach became angry and raised her voice, then started crying.
During this period she said words to the effect of "if you don't help me
I might smash the place up." Dr Fernando did not know whether this was
actually directed at her surgery or premises more general. The defendant Bach
was at various times begging, imploring or pleading. At around this time the
defendant Mason changed his position by moving closer to the door; he did this
by standing up and moving his chair a very short distance; he had an object
in his hand that he was jiggling around that Dr Fernando thought in a split
second was a knife; during the proceedings it emerged and was conceded by Dr
Fernando that the object was probably his key ring. Immediately at this point
she wrote the prescription; she wrote a prescription for the defendant Bach
and after he said, in a quiet voice, "what about me", she wrote one
for the defendant Mason. Ms Bach thanked her. Mr Mason took the slip of paper
with the telephone number on it for the hospital with him.
7. Dr Fernando wrote the prescriptions because she felt threatened. She felt
threatened for a number of reasons; first, the defendant Bach was getting angry
and had made the comment that she might smash the place up; she thought the
defendant Mason had a knife (it must be remembered he did not in fact have one);
there were two of them, patients in her room, being a divergence from her usual
practice, (especially with drug users, she would not see more than one patient
at a time); Dr Fernando has previously experienced threatening situations with
drug dependant patients; there was only herself and the receptionist present
at the surgery. Dr Fernando was clear that the defendants did not directly threaten
her. She agreed she felt confused about her reaction to what had occurred.
8. After the defendants left the consulting room, she said she felt relieved
and stayed in the room. She did not contact police but having thought it through,
contacted a pharmacy to stop the prescription being filled. She didn't do this
immediately and went on to see her next patient.
9. The defendants then had an argument with the receptionist about the accounts.
The defendants, probably through a conversation earlier in the day, were under
the belief they would be bulk billed or at least not have to pay on the spot.
Ms Crisp said she swiped the defendant Mason's Medi-Care card. Dr Fernando instructed
her not to worry about the account. She took the defendant Bach's address to
send the account. Further evidence confirms the address given was the correct
address. Ms Crisp confirmed the defendant Bach told her she had lost her key-card.
Another witness, Ms Thwaite confirmed the defendant Bach offered to leave her
wallet as some sort of security.
10. The defendants were interviewed by police. They deny the allegations. Both
seemed to be under the impression at the beginning of the interview that they
were suspects that had something to do with the fact that they didn't pay the
account.
The elements of the charge and conclusions on whether the charge is made out.
11. There are a number of authorities from other jurisdictions on the elements
of this crime. The charge must also be interpreted in the light of criminal
responsibility principles in the Northern Territory, in particular, the question
of mental element governed by s 31 Criminal Code most recently considered by
the Court of Criminal Appeal Director of Public Prosecutions Reference No. 1
of 2002 [2002] NTCCA11 . I bear in mind that the impugned acts and the consequent
event must be intended or foreseen as a possible consequence of the conduct.
12. Counsel for the Director, Mr Johnson concedes that there is no evidence
of pre-concert. He puts the prosecution case on the basis that both defendants,
by their various words or actions aided each other in the commission of the
offence. I agree this is a fair basis on which to put the case. To succeed on
this basis, each defendant must at least be aware of the purpose of the actions
of the other and be aware that their own actions aid the other. There being
no independent evidence of pre-concert or common purpose, it is not a case where
the evidence of the acts of each defendant can be relied upon as proof against
the other: (Tripodi R 104 LLR 512). Rather, it must be proved that each defendant
was aware they would aid the other by their words and / or actions. I agree
that all of the various acts of each defendant must be considered cumulatively
to determine whether there was a demand was made with menaces.
13. In my view it is overly clinical to require separate proof of the demand
and then determine whether there are any separate menaces that apply to the
making of the demand. The demand and the alleged menaces may be one and the
same, or there is at least a relationship between the demand and menaces offered.
This relationship between the two concepts is impliedly acknowledged in the
definition of menaces in s 1 Criminal Code. I intend to follow the approach
of the High Court in Austin v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 669 dealing with the
South Australian offence of sending a letter demanding property with menaces
where Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 675 stated:
"It is the behaviour of the offender in making a demand with menaces or
threats which is the gist of the offence and not actions or events over which
the offender may have no control….[I]t is appropriate to regard the offence
of demanding money with menaces or threats as complete when the demand has been
made in circumstances apt to achieve its communication to the person to whom
it is directed and with the necessary intent".
14. Professor Williams in his text, Property Offences, 3rd edition (1999),
LBC at 250 - 252 details the history of the various meanings attributed to the
word menaces. The Criminal Code (NT) definition appears to draw from a more
modern meaning at common law, said to be liberally construed as not limited
to threats of violence but as including threats of any action detrimental to
or unpleasant to the person addressed. It may also include a warning that in
certain events such an action is intended: (Thorne v Motor Trade Association
[1937] AC 797 at 817). Certainly the Criminal Code (NT) definition is not confined
to threats as the earlier common law may have been: (see Property Offences,
supra at 250-252).
15. To prove the commission of this offence, it must be shown the demand with
menaces must be of such a nature and extent that the mind of an ordinary person
of normal stability and courage might be influenced or made apprehensive so
as to accede unwillingly to the demand: (R v Clear [1968] 1 QB 670 at 679) This
reasoning was applied in Benasic v The Queen (1987) 77 ALR 340 where the Federal
Court accepted that the assessment of whether the mind of an ordinary person
of normal stability and courage might be influenced or made apprehensive was
an objective test. The Court further determined that although it was an objective
test, this did not prohibit evidence from the person allegedly menaced on how
they reacted to the demand as although not conclusive, it offers some assistance
to the fact finding tribunal in coming to a conclusion on the objective test.
The same reasoning is found in the NSW case of John Rae (1998) 104 A Crim R
348.
16. In applying the law to the facts in this case, there is one matter that
detracts significantly from the prosecution case, that is, Dr Fernando thought
the defendant Mason began to jiggle a knife around. She believed he had a knife
at the time. Police found a knife in the possession of the defendant when they
later searched his premises and car. They also located and seized a key ring.
The key ring is silver with a large hole. Dr Fernando remembers the hole. The
hole is in the key ring, not the knife. I should emphasise also that it is not
alleged the defendant was doing anything to create the pretence of carrying
or brandishing a knife. If he had done so, the situation would have been the
same as if he did have a knife. The glimpse of what she thought was a knife
formed a major part of the intimidation felt by Dr Fernando . There simply was
no knife.
17. In determining whether there was a demand for the methadone prescription
with menaces, the facts, (varying greatly in significance to the establishment
or otherwise of the charge), militating in favour of such a conclusion are the
statement by the defendant Bach that she said words to the effect of "if
you don't help me I might smash the place up;" that there were two persons
in the consulting room; that the two defendants angrily rejected the offer for
pandeine forte for pain relief; that the defendant Mason moved closer to the
door; that the speech of the defendant Bach was at times agitated and aggressive;
that Dr Fernando does not herself usually prescribe methadone; that Dr Fernando
felt threatened and that as a result of prescribing methadone when her usual
practise is not to, she called a pharmacy to cancel the prescription.
18. Circumstances militating in the other direction include the fact that there
was no knife; the statement "if you don't help me I might smash the place
up" and other angry words were interposed with crying and pleading; Dr
Fernando's evidence was in part ambiguous at the level of threat or discomfort
she felt, agreeing at one point that it may have been the fact that the defendants
were drug dependent that raised her apprehension; Dr Fernando maintained eye
contact throughout the consultation with Ms Bach; the defendant Mason asked
in a quiet voice what about me; the defendants left their names, correct addresses
and various other contact details with the receptionist after the consultation;
that the statements to police by the defendants indicate they thought they were
in some other type of trouble; that the defendants in even going to a GP were
acting on advice given by the Royal Darwin Hospital; that the defendant Bach
was suffering pain.
19. None of these factors or circumstances are determinative in their own right.
Much was made at the hearing of the fact Dr Fernando did not report the matter
to police. In my view, that is of marginal significance. In my view, professionals
working in the caring professions are unlikely to make a complaint to police
unless the circumstances are very serious. Dr Fernando took other action, namely
arranging for the pharmacy to cancel the prescription. Regardless of this, according
to he evidence, there is still some confusion in her mind about exactly what
was occurring in her room. I should mention also that Dr Fernando has wide experience
dealing with drug dependent persons. She has had some unpleasant professional
experiences in the past dealing with drug dependent patients. I completely understand
she wanted to bring an uncomfortable and difficult consultation to an end and
by prescribing the methadone, although she was uncomfortable doing it, that
brought about the desired object - to end the consultation.
20. As a criminal matter the prosecution must prove there was a demand with
menaces beyond reasonable doubt. In this matter there are many facts and circumstances
as outlined above that militate against such a conclusion. Much of that material
comes from the prosecution witnesses themselves. My summary of the various factors
assumes an element of aiding. Without that, and dealing with each defendant's
actions and words individually, the prosecution case becomes even weaker. Added
to that, when I assess the evidence of intent or foresight, even if it is accepted
that the defendants acted intentionally, it seems most unlikely that they foresaw
that their actions would result in a level of intimidation of such a nature
and extent that the mind of an ordinary person of normal stability and courage
might be influenced or made apprehensive so as to accede unwillingly to the
demand. It is my view that for the charge to succeed, under the rules of criminal
responsibility in the Northern Territory, it would have to be proved that the
defendants foresaw in general terms this consequence as a possibility: (s 31
Criminal Code (NT); Director of Public Prosecutions Reference No 1 (Supra).
21. For the above reasons I have concluded that the charge is not made out beyond
reasonable doubt against either defendant. The charge is therefore dismissed
and both defendants are discharged.
Dated this 21st day of May 2003.
_________________________
JENNY BLOKLAND
STIPENDIARY MAGISTRATE